Utah v. Shayne M. Hansen : Unknown by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Utah v. Shayne M. Hansen : Unknown
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Linda M. Jones, Otis Sterling; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; attorneys for respondent.
Jeffrey S. Gray; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; Nicholas M.
D\'Alesandro; attorneys for petitioner.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Hansen, No. 20010100.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1752
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
SHAYNE M. HANSEN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
CaseNo.20010100-SC 
Priority No. 13 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON CERTIORARI REVIEW 
LINDA M. JONES (5497) 
OTIS STERLING III (7636) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)532-5444 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
(801)366-0180 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
F I L E D 
CLERK SUPHtMt GOURT 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintifffPetitioner, 
SHAYNE M. HANSEN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
CaseNo.20010100-SC 
Priority No. 13 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON CERTIORARI REVIEW 
LINDA M. JONES (5497) 
OTIS STERLING III (7636) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)532-5444 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
(801)366-0180 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND OPINION BELOW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE RECORD IN THIS CASE FAILS TO SUPPORT 
CONSENT. 7 
A. THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" 
ANALYSIS APPLIES IN CONSIDERING "CONSENT" 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. THE COURT 
OF APPEALS APPLIED THE "TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES" ANALYSIS IN HANSEN. : 7 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS REFERRED TO LANGUAGE 
IN STATE V. HAMIYJAJ THIS COURT IN BISNER HAS 
SPECIFICALLY REJECTED. THAT IS NOT FATAL TO THE 
RESULT IN HANSEN'S CASE SINCE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS' REFERENCE TO HAM IS DICTUM. 9 
1. While the Court of Appeals' Analysis Set Forth in 
State v. Ham Is Incorrect in Part, It Is Also Irrelevant: 
In Hansen, the Reference to Ham Constitutes Dictum 10 
Page 
2. The State Has Attacked the First Prong Under 
State v. Ham on the Basis That It Is "Founded" in the 
"Presumption Against Waiver' Standard." The State's 
Argument Is Irrelevant. 13 
C. UNDER THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" 
ANALYSIS. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH CONSENT 
IN THIS CASE. 16 
1. The Conclusory Statements Relating to "Consent" Are 
Insufficient Under the Law. 22 
2. Huntington's Testimony Concerning "Consent" Reflects 
His Impressions of the Matter. His Impressions Are 
Irrelevant. 24 
3. The "Substantial. Competent Evidence" Fails to Support 
"Consent." 24 
4. The State Claims the Officer's Question. "Do You 
Mind If I Check." and Hansen's Answer. "Yes." Support 
Consent. Yet. Hansen's Response Constitutes an 
Unequivocal Objection to the Search. 26 
D. FOR POLICY REASONS. AN OFFICER'S CONCLUSORY 
STATEMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD NOT BE 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT. IF THE LAW ALLOWED OFFICERS SIMPLY 
TO TESTIFY THAT THEY HAD "CONSENT" OR "PROBABLE 
CAUSE" TO SUPPORT HE CONDUCT. THE STANDARD 




POINT II. THIS COURT DOES NOT NEED TO DECIDE THE 
EFFECTS OF HAM ON THIS CASE. SINCE THE "CONSENT" 
AND SEIZURE WERE POISONED BY A PRIOR ILLEGALITY. 
RENDERING THEM UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE 
SECOND PRONG OF THE THURMAN ANALYSIS. 31 
A. THE CONSENT WAS OBTAINED BY POLICE 
EXPLOITATION OF A PRIOR ILLEGALITY: OFFICER 
HUNTINGTON DETAINED HANSEN FOR FURTHER 
QUESTIONING WITHOUT REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION. 31 
1. Huntington Continued the Detention Beyond the 
Permissible Scope. 32 
2. The State Claims the Encounter Transformed from 
a Level-Two to a Level-One Encounter. The Objective 
Facts Fail to Support the State's Claim. 34 
3. The Officer Failed to Articulate Reasonable Suspicion 
for the Continued Detention. 38 
4. Hansen Is Entitled to Suppression of the Evidence 
Since the Officer Obtained "Consent" Through 
Exploitation of a Prior Illegality. 39 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED THAT THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING THE PRIOR 
ILLEGALITY CONSTITUTED COERCION. 40 
CONCLUSION 43 
Addendum A: State v. Hansen. 17 P.3d 1135 (Utah App. 2000) 
Addendum B: U.S. Const, amend. IV 
Addendum C: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
FEDERAL CASES 
Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) 32, 38, 42 
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 23, 29 
Katz v. U.S.. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 8 
Minnesota v. Dickerson. 508 U.S. 366 (1993) 12 
Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 10, 11 
Ohio v. Robinette. 519 U.S. 33 (1996) 24, 35, 36, 42 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218 (1973) 8,10,11, 12,14, 15,41 
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 32, 33 
U.S. v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984) 32 
STATE CASES 
Commonwealth v. Boswell. 721 A.2d 336 (Pa. 1998) 27 
McGoldrick v. Walker. 838 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1992) 13 
Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1996) 32 
State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) 8, 9, 12, 15, 39-41 
State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989) 23 
iy 
Page 
State v. Barnes. 978 P.2d 1131 (Wash. App. 1999) 24, 35 
State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1994) 34 
State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99,435 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 6, 8-10, 12-17, 26, 29, 40 
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) 8, 23 
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), cert denied. 
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) 11 
State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992) 33 
State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996) 33, 38, 39 
State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300 23 
State v. Contrel. 886 P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied, 
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) 11, 12 
State v. Davis. 965 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 16 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) 31, 32 
State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 23, 24 
State v. Genovesi. 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App. 1995) 11, 16 
State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133 (Utah App. 1991) 11 
State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 40 
State v. Hansen. 2000 UT 353, 17 P.3d 1135 passim 
v 
Page 
State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995) 8 
State v. Higgins. 884 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1994) 35 
State v. Humphrey. 937 P.2d 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 33 
State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) 32, 35 
State v. Keitz. 856 P.2d 685 (Utah App.1993) 11 
State v. Lewa. 951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997) 2 
State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) 24, 32, 33, 35, 38 
State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied. 
800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) 12, 15, 16 
State y. Munsen. 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991). cert, denied. 
843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992) 32 
State v. $175.800. 942 P.2d 343 (Utah 1997) 17 
State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655 (Utah App. 1996) 24, 35, 38 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 16, 17, 24, 31 
State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North. Orem. 924 P.2d 925 (Utah 1997) 17 
State v. Robinette. 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997) 35, 36 
State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990) 11,38 
State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913 (Utah App. 1992) 8, 32, 38, 39 
vi 
Page 
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) 3 
State v. South. 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996) 1,5 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 16, 17, 25, 29, 31, 39 
State v. Warren. 2001 UT App 346,434 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 16 
State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980) 8, 11, 42,43 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 2, 7 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1996) 1 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Black's Law Dictionary at 284 (7th ed. 1999) 22 
vii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
SHAYNE M. HANSEN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
CaseNo.20010100-SC 
Priority No. 13 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND OPINION BELOW 
This Court granted the state's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals in State v. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353.17P.3d 1135. The court of appeals'decision 
in Hansen is attached hereto as Addendum A. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1996); and as set forth in State v. South. 
924 P.2d 354, 355-57 (Utah 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
A. Whether the court of appeals' ruling in State v. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, should 
be affirmed since the totality of the circumstances failed to support consent to search. 
B. Whether the "consent" and resulting seizure were invalid where they were 
poisoned by a prior police illegality. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court adopts the same standard of 
review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and 
findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. Lewa. 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 
1997) (cite omitted). The court of appeals reviewed the issues on appeal in this case using 
a bifurcated standard: n[T]he trial court's ultimate conclusion that consent was voluntary or 
involuntary is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 
1993). However, f[T]he trial court's underlying factual findings will not be set aside unless 
they are found to be clearly erroneous.' Id" Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^7. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provision will be determinative of the questions presented for review: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. The text of that provision is contained in the attached Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
On February 18, 1999, the state filed an Information against Hansen for unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). (R.2-3.) On July 2,1999, Hansen 
filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search. (R. 23-25.) After 
an evidentiary hearing (R. 49; 84), the trial juge denied the motion. (R. 69.) A copy of the 
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law is attached hereto as Addendum C 
2 
(hereinafter "Findings" and/or "Conclusions"). 
On August 20, 1999, Hansen entered into a conditional guilty plea, wherein he pled 
guilty to unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony offense. 
The trial court dismissed the charge for drug paraphernalia and Hansen specifically 
"retain[ed] his right to appeal" the trial court's "denial of his motion to suppress," pursuant 
to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). (R. 55; see also 58.) Thereafter, Hansen 
appealed. On December 14, 2000, the court of appeals issued an opinion reversing the trial 
court's ruling on the matter. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353. This Court granted the state's 
petition for a writ of certiorari review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 11, 1998, Officer Huntington was driving behind Hansen. As 
Huntington initiated a computer check on Hansen's car, he observed Hansen make "an 
improper lane change." (R. 84:6-12.) Also, the computer check revealed that Hansen's car 
was uninsured. (R. 84:10.) Huntington initiated a traffic stop and pulled behind Hansen in 
a convenience store parking lot. (R. 84:10-11.) Huntington's emergency lights were 
activated. (Id); Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, %2. 
"Officer Huntington, dressed in uniform and carrying a sidearm, exited his patrol car 
and confronted Hansen." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353,1J3; (R. 84:8,11,19). Huntington told 
Hansen he had been stopped for "improper lane change" and lack of insurance. (R.84:12.) 
Hansen told Officer Huntington that he did not have insurance "because he could not afford 
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it." (R. 84:12-13.) Huntington then requested Hansen's license and registration and returned 
to his patrol car to run a computer check. The check revealed a valid license and no 
outstanding warrants for arrest. (R. 84:13); Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, Tf3. 
As Officer Huntington returned to Defendant Hansen's car, the encounter intensified: 
a second officer pulled behind Hansen, activated his emergency lights, and stepped out of 
his patrol car. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, [^3; (R. 84:14, 36-37). 
Huntington returned the license and registration to Hansen and informed him to obtain 
insurance for the car. Huntington intended to give Hansen a warning for the "improper lane 
change" (R. 84:16-17), but did not recall saying anything about the matter. (R. 84:32-34,35-
36, 43-45.) Instead, without any break in the conversation and without any discussion 
concerning the lane change, Huntington asked Hansen if he had alcohol, weapons, or drugs 
in the vehicle. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353,1J4; (R- 84:16-17, 37-38). Hansen answered, 
"no." Huntington then asked, "Do you mind if I check?" Hansen answered, "yes." Hansen, 
2000 UT App 353, Tf4; (R. 84:17-18, 38-40). 
Thereafter, Huntington told Hansen and his passenger to step out of the car and to 
stand next to the second officer. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, %5 (R. 84:19-20). Hansen and 
the passenger complied. Huntington conducted a search and found a billy club and a 
marijuana pipe on the floor of the driver's area of Hansen's car. (R. 84:20-21.) Officer 
Huntington asked "whose marijuana pipe it was" and Hansen said it was his. (R. 84:21.) 
The officer arrested Hansen and searched him incident thereto, locating a substance that he 
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believed to be methamphetamine. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^ [5; (R. 84:22). 
During proceedings in the trial court, Hansen moved to suppress the evidence seized 
during the warrantless search. (R. 23-25, 84). The trial court denied the motion. (R. 69.) 
Hansen appealed. The court of appeals reversed the matter on the grounds that the state 
failed to establish consent. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353. 
Hansen also argued on appeal that the "consent" and seizure of evidence were 
poisoned by a prior illegality. See id. at ^[25, n.9. This Court may consider that issue on 
review as an alternative basis for affirming the court of appeals1 ruling. South, 924 P.2d at 
355-57. Additional facts relating to this matter are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court upheld Officer Huntington's warrantless search in this case on the basis 
that Hansen gave valid consent. A search following consent is lawful if (1) the consent was 
voluntarily given, and (2) it was not obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. In this case, the trial court erred in its determination; the 
"consent" was unlawful under both prongs of the Thurman analysis. 
Specifically, with respect to the first prong, Huntington testified that he requested 
consent to search by asking Hansen, "Do you mind if I check [the car for alcohol, weapons, 
or drugs]." According to the officer, Hansen said "yes." The officer's testimony of the 
matter failed to support consent. Thereafter, the officer testified in a conclusory fashion that 
he had consent to search and he assumed he had consent. According to the law, conclusory 
statements will not support a search under the Fourth Amendment. Also, an officer's 
5 
impressions/assumptions are irrelevant to the analysis. The court of appeals ruled the 
evidence was insufficient for consent. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353. That ruling was correct. 
The state takes issue with the court of appeals' ruling because the court cited to a 
'"presumption against waiver' standard" inStatev.Ham.910 P.2d 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The court of appeals' reference to that standard constitutes dictum in the context of Hansen's 
case, and it is irrelevant. Indeed, this Court rejected the '"presumption against waiver' 
standard" in State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, ^ 44-47,435 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. Hansen has relied 
on Bisner in the analysis in this case. This Court's ruling in Bisner does not change the result 
in Hansen. 2000 UT App 353. The court of appeals' ruling should be upheld. 
Next, even if this Court determined that consent was voluntary under the first prong 
of the Thurman analysis, the consent was invalid where it was obtained by police 
exploitation of a prior illegality. Officer Huntington unlawfully exceeded the scope of the 
justification for the stop in this case in order to engage in an investigatory search of Hansen's 
car. The unlawful investigation and detention poisoned "consent." 
The state disagrees and claims that when Officer Huntington obtained "consent" to 
search the car, Hansen was free to go. The state ignores the facts in evidence. When Officer 
Huntington obtained "consent," the matter was escalating: Hansen remained detained. The 
court of appeals correctly ruled that Officer Huntington unlawfully continued the detention 
and the investigation in order to search the car. On that basis, the officer's prior conduct 
poisoned the consent and seizure of evidence. The warrantless search may not be upheld. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE RECORD IN THIS CASE FAILS TO SUPPORT CONSENT. 
The state claims the court of appeals applied an incorrect analysis to the consent issue 
in this case. Yet, the court of appeals looked to the "totality of the circumstances" to find that 
the evidence failed to support consent. See infra. Points LA. and C, herein. 
The court of appeals also cited to a '"presumption against waiver' standard" that has 
been rejected by this Court. The court of appeals' reference to the "presumption" standard 
was incorrect, but otherwise inconsequential. That is, rejecting the '"presumption against 
waiver' standard" does not change the result in this case. See infra, Point I.B., herein. 
Also, the state claims the court of appeals failed to give proper deference to the trial 
court's findings relating to consent. The state has failed in its analysis to identify any 
findings that were not given deference, and it has failed to identify how the court of appeals' 
review of those findings was incorrect. On that basis, the state's argument must fail. 
A. THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" ANALYSIS APPLIES IN 
CONSIDERING "CONSENT" UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. THE 
COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUM-
STANCES" ANALYSIS IN HANSEN. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the following: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and parti-
cularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. Unless a governmental agency has secured a valid warrant to 
conduct a search, the search is presumptively unlawful, "subject only to a few specifically 
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established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. U.S.. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see 
State v.Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). 
One of the "recognized exception[s]ff to the warrant requirement is consent. Brown. 
853 P.2d at 855; State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, Tf43; State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684,687 (Utah 
1990); State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992). 
In considering consent, this Court has consistently followed U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent. It has considered the totality of the circumstances and it has looked to whether 
consent was obtained "as rthe product of duress or coercion, express or implied/" Bisner, 
2001 UT 99, Tf47 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)); see also. 
State v.Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196,1206 (Utah 1995); State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103,106 
(Utah 1980). This Court also has ruled that consent must be voluntary, and it may not be 
obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, T}43 (citing 
Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262). 
In the underlying opinion to this case, the court of appeals relied on the "totality of the 
circumstances" analysis identified above. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, <fll 8 ("In determining 
whether consent was voluntarily given we will look to the 'totality of all the circumstances'") 
(citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). The court of appeals also relied on the two-part test 
articulated in Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262. See Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, f7 n.5 & 1J18 
("[A] defendant's consent to a search following illegal police activity is valid under the 
Fourth Amendment only if both of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given 
voluntarily, and (ii) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
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illegality") (citing Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262; State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 
1990)). Those standards support the court of appeals' ruling in this case that "consent" was 
invalid, as further discussed below. See infra. Point I.C., herein. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS REFERRED TO LANGUAGE IN STATE v. 
HAM THAT THIS COURT IN BISNER HAS SPECIFICALLY REJECTED. 
THAT IS NOT FATAL TO THE RESULT IN HANSEN'S CASE SINCE THE 
COURT OF APPEALS' REFERENCE TO HAM IS DICTUM. 
In addition to applying the "totality of the circumstances" analysis to the consent 
issue, the court of appeals in Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, also quoted from State v. Ham, 910 
P.2d 433 (Utah App. 1996). It stated the following: 
This court has adopted the following analytical framework to determine whether the 
State has met its burden of proving that consent was voluntarily given: 
"(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 'unequivocal and 
specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'; (2) the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating 
these first two standards, we] indulge every reasonable presumption against the 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence 
that such rights were waived." 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, Tfl8 (citing Ham, 910 P.2d at 439). 
This Court in Bisner has since rejected portions of the court of appeals' "analytical 
framework" identified above. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, Tflf44-47. That does not change the court 
of appeals1 result in Hansen for two reasons. 
First, in ruling that consent was invalid, the court of appeals did not rely on those 
portions of Ham that have been rejected. Thus, the state's arguments concerning Ham are 
irrelevant. See infra. Points I.B.I, and I.B.2. Second, under the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" analysis, the record in this case fails to support consent. On that basis, the court 
9 
of appeals' ruling must be affirmed. See infra. Point I.C. 
1. While the Court of Appeals1 Analysis Set Forth in State v. Ham Is Incorrect in Part, 
It Is Also Irrelevant: In Hansen, the Reference to Ham Constitutes Dictum. 
In this case, the court of appeals quoted from Ham, 910 P.2d at 439, as follows: "[we] 
indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional 
rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived." Hansen, 2000 
UT App 353, [^18 (emphasis added) (citing Ham). The state refers to the emphasized 
language above as the "'presumption against waiver1 standard." (State's Brief of Petitioner, 
at 15-16.) According to the state, the court of appeals' reference to the "presumption" 
standard renders Hansen invalid. The state's claims are incorrect. 
Specifically, the '"presumption against waiver' standard" has been construed to mean 
that in order for consent to be valid, the state first must establish that the "consenting party 
affirmatively waived [his] constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, Tf44 (emphasis added). That is, as a necessary prerequisite to the 
consent determination, the state would be required to show that the officer provided Miranda-
type warnings1 and obtained a "knowing and intelligent waiver" from the defendant under 
the Fourth Amendment. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235. In Schneckloth, the United 
States Supreme Court rejected the use of such warnings and the "presumption" standard as 
it stood for that proposition. Id at 242-44. 
The Utah Court of Appeals likewise has rejected the proposition that an officer must 
1
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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first obtain a "knowing and intelligent waiver" with Miranda-type warnings in order for 
consent to be valid. State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111-12 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied, 
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) ("In SchnecklothfJ. the United States Supreme Court expressly 
rejected the proposition that the Fourth Amendment requires an enforcement officer to 
inform a person of his or her right to refuse consent to search.... This interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment has been continuously applied in Utah". . . "JWJe decline to interpret 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution as requiring a knowing consent") (citing 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106; State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685, 691 (Utah App.1993); State v. 
Carter, 812 P.2d 460,468 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); State 
v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah App.1991); and State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 
(Utah App. 1990)); see also State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah App. 1995) 
^Defendant contends that his wife's consent was not voluntary because she was unaware of 
her right to refuse consent. He argues that, on the strength of Article I, section 14, of the 
Utah Constitution, we should mandate Miranda-type disclosures about one's rights when 
police ask for permission to conduct a search"... "We recently rejected this contention and 
held that proving voluntary consent under the Utah Constitution, as well as its federal 
counterpart, does not include proving that the defendant knew of his or her right to refuse 
to consent to a search") (cites omitted). 
Thus, while the Utah Court of Appeals has complied with Schneckloth and rejected 
the "'presumption against waiver1 standard" in cases where the issue of a "knowing and 
11 
intelligent waiver" has been raised and discussed on appeal, the court of appeals never-
theless has continued to refer to the "presumption" standard in its "analytical framework" 
for consent. See Ham, 910 P.2d at 439; see also State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).2 That reference is confusing. 
This Court specifically has rejected the court of appeals' references to the 
"presumption" standard. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, T[44-47. That is appropriate. 
Inasmuch as Hansen's case does not hinge on "the proposition that the Fourth 
Amendment requires an enforcement officer to inform a person of his or her right to refuse 
consent to search," see Contrel 886 P.2d at 111, and it does not hinge on the "'presumption 
against waiver' standard," it is inconsequential that the court of appeals in State v. Hansen 
2The Supreme Court in Schneckloth recognized that '"[wjaiver' is a vague term used for 
a great variety of purposes, good and bad, in the law." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235. To that 
end, it may be argued that in those cases where the Utah Court of Appeals simply made 
reference to the '"presumption against waiver' standard," it was not citing to the standard for 
any improper or "bad" purpose. That is, the court of appeals was not suggesting officers first 
had to obtain a "knowing and intelligent waiver" to support consent. See Contrel 886 P.2d 
at 111 (specifically rejecting the "knowing and intelligent waiver" standard). 
By way of explanation, the "waiver" doctrine identified by the court of appeals may 
be interpreted as follows: The U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have reiterated time and 
again that searches and seizures "conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — 
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Minnesota 
v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993); Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. In that regard, unless the 
state has established the application of a well-delineated exception, there is a "presumption 
against" the validity of the warrantless search, /. e. the search is "per se unreasonable." That 
is proper in the law. Under that interpretation, the court of appeals may have been using the 
"presumption" language for a "good" purpose. 
Although the court of appeals likely had "good" intentions, the "presumption" 
language is somewhat confusing. In that regard, the better approach is to discontinue 
reference to the "presumption." See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, TJ47. 
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made reference to the "presumption" standard. See Bisner, 2001 UT 99,1J47 ("[T]o the 
degree [the court of appeals' analysis] hinges consent upon waiver — and to the extent our 
prior cases have not made our position perfectly clear- we today explicitly reject the court 
of appeals1 voluntariness test as enunciated in Marshall and its progeny"). 
That is, in Hansen's case, the court of appeals' reference to the "presumption" 
standard was harmless. The standard was irrelevant to the appeal issue and to the final 
determination in the case. Hansen did not rely on the "presumption" in demonstrating the 
illegality of the search. He did not claim that in order for the state to establish consent, it 
must show that he was informed of his constitutional rights against an unreasonable search, 
or that he "knowingly and intelligently waived" those rights. 
Thus, the reference to the "presumption" in the underlying opinion to this case 
constituted dictum. It was not controlling and it carried little persuasive authority. 
See McGoldrickv. Walker. 838 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1992). 
Finally, the state has failed to explain how rejection of the '"presumption against 
waiver' standard" would change the analysis in this case. (See. State's Brief of Petitioner in 
general.) On that basis, its claims must be rejected on review. 
2. The State Has Attacked the First Prong Under State v. Ham on the Basis That It 
Is "Founded" in the '"Presumption Against Waiver' Standard." The State's Argument 
Is Irrelevant. 
In its brief on certiorari, the state also seems to attack the "first prong" of the court 
of appeals' "analytical framework" in Ham. (See State's Brief of Petitioner at 16-19.) The 
"first prong" concerns the following: "[To determine whether the State has met its burden 
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of proving that consent was voluntary] (1) There must be clear and positive testimony that 
the consent was 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given.'" Hansen. 
2000 UT App 353,1(18 (citing Ham, 910 P.2d at 439). 
The state claims that under that prong, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
"any consent must be 'freely' given" (State's Brief of Petitioner at 16), but has rejected the 
notion that consent must be "intelligent" (State's Brief of Petitioner at 16-17 (citing 
Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 234-35)); and the court of appeals' "requirement of clear and 
positive testimony simply employs [the] presumption against waiver requirement." (State's 
Brief of Petitioner at 17.) 
The state does not take issue with the court of appeals' use of the language "un-
equivocal and specific" in the "first prong." In fact, the state asserts that language "simply 
requires the State to make the threshold showing that consent was in fact given and that the 
search was within the scope of the consent." (State's Brief of Petitioner at 18.) 
In response to the state's complaints regarding the "first prong," Hansen maintains the 
state has misread the court of appeals' ruling in Hansen, and misapplied Schneckloth. In 
addition, the state's complaints are irrelevant. In this case, Bisner governs. 
By way of explanation, in Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, the court of appeals looked to 
whether consent was "freely and intelligently given" to assess "duress and coercion." Id. at 
T|22 (the phrase "freely and intelligently" relates to whether consent was obtained without 
duress or coercion, express or implied). Duress and coercion are relevant to the analysis 
under Bisner. See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^ 47 (consent is not voluntary if it is obtained with 
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duress and coercion, express or implied). This Court in Bisner, stated that the test 
articulated in Ham and Marshall "correctly requires absence of duress or coercion for 
consent to be deemed voluntary." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f44. Thus, read in context, that 
language is appropriate.3 
As for the phrase "clear and positive testimony," it is another way of saying the state 
must prove consent with "substantial, competent evidence" on the matter. Bisner, 2001 UT 
99, ^ [42 (citing Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687). The state must establish "that consent was in fact 
given and that the search was within the scope of the consent." (State's Brief of Petitioner 
at 18 (state does not take issue with court of appeals' language that evidence must support 
"unequivocal and specific" consent)); see Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^ [21 (court of appeals 
determined whether consent was in fact given by assessing whether there was "clear and 
positive" testimony that "Hansen's response was unequivocal and specific"). 
The phrase should not be construed to mean anything more than what is set forth in 
Bisner. In addition, the phrase does not impose a greater burden on the prosecution than that 
which already exists. (See State's Brief of Petitioner at 17-18 (state recognizes 
3
 The state claims Schneckloth rejected the use of the term "intelligently" in assessing 
consent. Yet, in that case, the Supreme Court addressed a "narrow" question: whether the 
government must provide evidence of a "knowing and intelligent waiver " to obtain a valid 
consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234-35; 248. The Court in Schneckloth did not discuss 
the issue of "intelligent" consent. 
Also, the phrase "freely and intelligently" as used in Hansen should not be 
misconstrued. Specifically, Hansen did not claim that for consent to be valid the state must 
establish he was educated or of high intelligence. Hansen likewise did not argue that 
"consent" must be intelligent in that it must be "informed" or "knowing." In the context of 
this case, the phrase "freely and intelligently" related to the absence of duress or coercion. 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^ [22. Thus, the state's claims on review are irrelevant. 
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preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, then asserts that "[t]o the extent the requirement 
of'clear and positive testimony' requires something more, it is error").) The court of appeals 
has specifically recognized the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in suppression 
hearings and has not required more. See State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, ^ f 17,434 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 31; State v. Davis. 965 P.2d 525, 533 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); GenovesL 909 P.2d 
at 923 n. 8. The state's suggestions to the contrary are irrelevant. 
Whether this Court accepts or rejects the "first prong" set forth in Ham and Marshall 
is of no consequence. When the brush is cleared, the state's arguments are irrelevant. In this 
case, the record fails to contain "substantial, competent evidence" to support consent under 
the totality of the circumstances. Under the standard articulated in Bisner and Thurman, the 
court of appeals reached the correct result, as further set forth below. 
C. UNDER THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" ANALYSIS. 
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH CONSENT IN THIS CASE. 
In Bisner, this Court ruled that the issue of consent must be supported by "substantial, 
competent evidence." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^ [42. "Substantial, competent evidence" consists 
of "the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or 
taking place, as well as the subjective, such as state of mind." Pena, 869 P.2d at 935; (see 
State's Brief at 18 (acknowledging that "consent" must be unequivocal and specific)). 
The substantial, competent evidence must furnish the basis for the trial court's factual 
findings. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, TJ42. Also, "[t]he findings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.' The findings 
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'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" State v. Real Property at 
633 East 640 North. Orem, 924 P.2d 925,931 (Utah 1997) (cite omitted). It stands to reason 
that if the findings must be sufficiently detailed and articulated, the evidence supporting the 
findings must be likewise. (See State's Brief of Petitioner at 18 (consent must be unequivocal 
and specific).) 
In this case, the court of appeals determined the findings were deficient. See Hansen. 
2000 UT App 353. The officer's testimony concerning the "events, actions, or conditions 
happening, existing, or taking place," Pena. 869 P.2d at 935, failed to support consent. 
The state disagrees with that ruling. It claims the court of appeals failed to give 
proper deference to the trial court's finding of fact "that defendant consented to the search." 
(State's Brief of Petitioner at 22.) 
The state's argument is incorrect as a matter of law since "consent" is a legal 
conclusion, see Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^ 42 (consent is a question of law),4 and it is incorrect 
4
 The state has dedicated relevant portions of its argument to the proposition that 
"consent" is a "factual finding." (See State's Brief of Petitioner at 19-27.) That is incorrect, 
as this Court specified in Bisner: "The question of whether a party has consented to a search 
is a question of law, and we therefore review it for correctness." Bisner. 2001 UT 99, TJ42; 
see Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1271 (ultimate conclusion that consent was voluntary or 
involuntary is a question of law); State v. $175.800. 942 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1997) 
("Whether consent is an exception to a warrantless seizure is a question of law to be 
reviewed for correctness"); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
The state advanced the same, incorrect proposition in the court of appeals. (See 
State's Brief of Appellee, dated June 19, 2000, at pp. 15-18.) As a result, when that court 
reversed the trial court's ruling on consent, it also stated, "To the extent its determination 
17 
in the context of this case. Here, the trial court did not "find" consent. Rather, the trial court 
"concluded" consent. (See R. 68, «|8; a copy of the trial court's Findings and Conclusions is 
attached hereto as Addendum C.) 
Also, the state's argument is deficient. The state has failed in its brief to identify any 
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 finding of fact" on consent that should have been sustained.5 (See State's Brief of Petitioner 
in general.) Indeed, the state has failed to mention any trial court "Finding" whatsoever in 
its argument. (See State's Brief of Petitioner in general; see also R. 63-39 ("Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law").) 
Next, the state claims the evidence of record supports consent. The evidence reflects 
the following: 
[PROSECUTOR:] And when you asked him for consent, do you recall now exactly 
how you phrased that? 
[HUNTINGTON:] It's my practice to ask them for consent by stating, Do you have 
any alcohol, weapons or drugs in the vehicle? And if they say no, I say, Well, do you 
mind if I check? 
Q. Do you recall Mr. Hansen responding to your question[s]? 
amounted to a finding of fact, it was clearly erroneous." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^21. 
That language does not support that the court of appeals was "uncertain as to the 
appropriate standard of appellate review," as the state claims here. (See State's Brief of 
Petitioner at 20.) Rather, the court of appeals simply was responding to the state's incorrect 
assertion that consent is a "factual finding." 
5
 To be clear, the state is not claiming that Hansen somehow failed in the court of appeals 
to properly challenge the relevant findings or to marshal the evidence. Indeed, the state has 
no claim where that is concerned. (See Hansen's Brief of Appellant, dated April 18, 2000, 
at 13-18; Hansen's Reply Brief of Appellant, dated August 18, 2000, at 9-10.) 
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A. He did give me consent. 
Q. Well first, with respect to the question as to whether he had those items in his car. 
A. No. He said no. 
Q. He said no. 
THE COURT: And the query again, Officer, was, Do you have any -
THE WITNESS: Alcohol, drugs or weapons. 
[PROSECUTOR RESUMING] 
Q. To which Mr. Hansen said no? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then you asked, Do you mind [if] I check? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And what was his response to that question? 
A. He said yes. 
[JUDGE LEWIS]: Yes, he minded? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I could have consent to search. 
* * * 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So you then indicated that you asked him if you could 
search the vehicle? 
A. I did. 
Q. Do you recall specifically what you said to him. 
A. Not specifically. 
Q. Do you have any idea? 
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A. I would imagine I stated: Do you have any alcohol, drugs or weapons in the 
vehicle? 
Q. He said no? 
A. He said no. Do you mind if I check? 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then he said yes. 
[JUDGE LEWIS]: He said? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He [said] yes. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
[JUDGE LEWIS]: Do you mind if I check and he said yes? 
THE WITNESS: Well, do you mind if I check, and then yes, he gave me consent. 
Sorry. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: (Resuming) 
Q. So you said he gave you consent? 
A. Yes, he did give me consent. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. What? 
Q. What did he say? 
A. What did he say? 
Q. Yeah. 
















So you don't recall his exact words? 
Not exactly. 
So are you assuming that he said yes? 
I assume that he said yes. 
That's what you're doing today? 
I'm sorry? 
That's what you're doing today? 
That's what I'm doing today? 
Yes, in terms of his response. 
I assume that he said yes. 
Nothing more than that? 
He probably could have said yes, go ahead. 
But you don't recall him saying that? 
I don't recall. 
* * * 
[PROSECUTOR]: Now, Officer Huntington, when you say the defendant gave his 
consent for you to check inside his vehicle, was it verbal. 
A. It was verbal. 
Q. Is it you just don't recall what the exact words were? 
A. I don't recall the exact wording. 
(R. 84:17^18,38-40,43). 
In sum, the officer testified to the basic substance of his conversation with Hansen. 
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The officer asked, "Do you mind if I [search your car]?" and Hansen answered, "yes." (R. 
84:17-18, 38-40.) The officer's testimony of the facts and circumstances failed to support 
consent. (See R. 84:18, 39-40); Hansen. 2000 UT App 353. 
In its brief, the state claims that "Officer Huntington clarified that defendant 
responded, 'Yes, I could have consent to search."' (State's Brief of Petitioner at 23 (emphasis 
added).) That claim disregards the evidence of record and misrepresents the matter. 
According to the record, when Huntington was given the opportunity to clarify or 
explain the circumstances supporting consent, he failed to do so. (R. 84:38-40.) Huntington 
was either unable or unwilling to provide substantial, competent evidence of consent. (R. 
84:38-40, 43.) Indeed, in clarifying the matter, Huntington specifically did not recall that 
Hansen responded "yes, go ahead" for consent (R. 84:40), or anything to that effect. (R. 
84:38-40.) Huntington simply assumed he had consentto search (R. 84:40), and he admitted 
to the prosecutor that he could not recall what was said, other than it was verbal. (Compare 
R. 84:43 (Huntington could not recall what was said), with State's Brief of Petitioner at 23 
(state claims "defendant responded 'yes, I could have consent to search'").) 
The substantial, competent evidence fails to support consent, as explained below. 
1. The Conclusorv Statements Relating to "Consent" Are Insufficient Under the Law. 
Under the totality of the circumstances analysis, conclusory statements are insufficient 
to support a search under the Fourth Amendment. Conclusory statements do not constitute 
substantial, competent evidence of the circumstances surrounding the matter. See Black's 
Law Dictionary at 284 (7th ed. 1999) (a "conclusory" statement is a "factual inference" that 
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does not include "the underlying facts on which the inference is based"). 
To explain, in this case the state was required to establish "consent" by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See Brown, 853 P.2d at 855 (the state bears the burden of 
proving consent at a motion to suppress hearing by a preponderance of the evidence). This 
Court has ruled that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is greater even than the 
probable-cause standard. See State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9, If 11,20 P.3d 300. Under the lesser 
probable-cause standard, the United States Supreme Court, this Court and the Utah Court 
of Appeals have consistently ruled that conclusory statements will not justify an officer's 
search under the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,239 (1983) (applying 
the "totality of the circumstances" analysis, a judge must be presented with sufficient, 
specific facts to issue a search warrant, otherwise, the judge's ruling will consist of "a mere 
ratification of the bare conclusions of others"); see. id_ at 234 (recognizing that 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard is more finely-tuned than the "probable cause" 
standard); State v. BabbelL 770 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1989) (in the context of the warrant 
requirement under the lesser, probable-cause standard, an officer's conclusory statements are 
insufficient); see also State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(conclusory statements are insufficient). 
Here, Huntington's testimony was conclusory, where he stated, "[Hansen] did give 
me consent"; "Yes, I could have consent to search"; "He gave me consent"; and "Yes, he did 
give me consent." (R. 84:17-18, 38-40.) When counsel asked Huntington to describe 
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generally the circumstances supporting those conclusory statements,6 Huntington refused and 
failed to do so, relying on his conclusory impressions of the matter. (Id.) 
In this case, the conclusory statements were insufficient to support consent. 
2. Huntington's Testimony Concerning "Consent" Reflects His Impressions of the 
Matter. His Impressions Are Irrelevant. 
Next, Huntington's statements supporting "consent" consist only of his impressions 
or assumptions. Huntington's impressions fail to include the "things, events, actions, or 
conditions happening, existing, or taking place," Pena, 869 P.2d at 935, under the total 
circumstances. Thus, under the law they are irrelevant. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 
1136-37 (Utah 1994) (an officer's state of mind is irrelevant); State v. Patefield 927 P.2d 
655, 659 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Barnes, 978 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Wash. App. 1999) 
(officer's belief is immaterial); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996). 
3. The "Substantial Competent Evidence" Fails to Support "Consent." 
6
 As set forth above, the state claims the following: "Officer Huntington clarified that 
defendant responded 'Yes, I could have consent to search.'" (State's Brief of Petitioner at 23.) 
That claim is not supported by the record. 
Specifically, according to Huntington, Hansen answered "yes," to Huntingdon's 
question, "Do you mind if I check?" When counsel asked for clarification and a general 
description of the circumstances supporting consent, Huntington was unable to provide such. 
(R. 84:38-40 (defense counsel asked if Huntington had an "idea" how consent was obtained, 
and counsel asked generally, "what did [Hansen] say?"); R. 84:43 (Huntington could not 
recall what was said).) Instead, Huntington provided conclusory statements. (Id.) 
Huntington also twice conceded that he assumed he had consent to search. (R. 84:40.) 
When counsel asked if there was anything more, Huntington stated: "[Hansen] probably 
could have said yes, go ahead," but he did not recall that Hansen made that statement. (R. 
84:40.) The record reflects that Huntington either was unable or he refused to provide a 
general description of the circumstances supporting consent. Either way, the state failed in 
its burden of proof. 
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The state apparently considers Huntington's testimony to be "contradictory"on the 
issue of consent. The state seems to acknowledge that the specific facts and circumstances 
fail to support consent, while Huntington's impressions "verify]" consent. (State's Brief of 
Petitioner at 23.) The state also argues that the court of appeals was required to defer to the 
trial court's reliance on Huntington's impressions of the matter, rather than the facts relating 
to the total circumstances. (See id. at 24.) That is incorrect. 
Under the law, an appellate court gives deference to the trial court's findings of fact 
because of the "trial court's advantaged position in judging credibility and resolving 
evidentiary conflicts." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. In this case, the trial court found Hunt-
ington to be credible. The court of appeals deferred to the trial court on that issue. See 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, Tf4 n.3 (Huntington testified with commendable candor). Also, 
there were no evidentiary conflicts since Huntington was the only person to testify. While 
Huntington w&s credible, his testimony was not sufficient to support consent. The testimony 
did not constitute substantial, competent evidence on the matter. 
Stated another way, the record does not reflect a contradiction in the facts. Accor-
ding to the facts and circumstances, Huntington asked Hansen "Do you mind if I check [your 
car for alcohol, drugs or weapons]?" Hansen answered unequivocally, "yes." (R. 84:17-18, 
38-40.) The facts fail to support consent. Thereafter, the officer testified in a conclusory 
fashion to his impressions of the matter. His impressions and conclusory statements are 
irrelevant. See supra subpoint I.C.I, and I.C.2., above. The court of appeals' ruling should 
be affirmed. 
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4. The State Claims the Officer's Question. "Do You Mind If I Check." and Hansen's 
Answer. "Yes." Support Consent. Yet. Hansen's Response Constitutes an 
Unequivocal Objection to the Search. 
Finally, the state argues that Huntington's testimony regarding the specific circum-
stances supports consent: "Common experience teaches that questions beginning with the 
words, 'do you mind,' are often answered in the affirmative even though the intent is to 
indicate that the speaker does not mind." (State's Brief of Petitioner at 24.) The state fails 
to identify the basis for that assertion.7 Rather, it cites to cases where the witness was not 
expected at trial to recall a conversation verbatim, but was asked only to give the "substance" 
of the conversation. (State's Brief of Petitioner at 26-27.) 
7
 The state is incorrect about "common experience," since the answer "yes" to a question 
that begins "do you mind" literally means the answering party objects. For example, 
"Do you mind if I smoke?" 
[From the 16-year-old son]: "Dad, do you mind if I take the Porsche?" 
[From the 16-year-old daughter]: "Do you mind if I stay out until 3:00 a.m." 
According to the state's argument, when an officer testifies that he obtained consent 
by asking, "Do you mind if I search," a trial judge should be free to interpret the defendant's 
affirmative response to support consent. That argument conflicts with the state's 
acknowledgment that consent must be "unequivocal and specific." (State's Brief of Petitioner 
at 18.) It also disregards the law, which requires the evidence to be competent and 
substantial on the matter. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^|42. 
In this case, the trial court did not consider the substantive evidence to support 
consent. According to the record, when the officer testified that Hansen responded in the 
affirmative to the question, "Do you mind if I check," the trial court interrupted the 
examination and pointed out the problem with the officer's testimony. Thereafter, the trial 
court disregarded the substantive evidence and relied only on the officer's unsubstantiated, 
irrelevant conclusory statements and impressions to find consent. 
Finally, the state's argument about "common experience" supports potentially 
troubling results. Imagine a criminal defendant claiming he had "consent" to engage in 
sexual activity when he specifically asked the victim, "Do you mind if I do this," and she said 
"yes." In that instance, surely the state would argue that the word "yes" must be given its 
plain, unambiguous, and literal meaning: the victim objected to the sexual conduct. 
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In this case, Officer Huntington was not expected to recall verbatim the conversation 
supporting "consent." Rather, counsel for the defense asked Officer Huntington to give only 
an "idea" of the events that transpired in the matter. (R. 84:39-40 (counsel asked Huntington, 
"Do you have any idea" what you said to him; and he asked, "what did [Hansen] say" 
regarding consent).) Defense counsel requested a general description of the events. 
Officer Huntington refused to provide a description, other than to say that he asked 
Hansen, "Do you mind if I check," and Hansen answered, "yes." The officer also responded 
to defense counsel's requests for general information by stating, "I don't recall exactly other 
than it was consent" and he assumed he had consent. (R. 84:17-18,38-40.) Thus, the officer 
declined to describe the general events supporting consent. 
Next, the state has cited to Commonwealth v. BoswelL 721 A.2d336,342(Pa. 1998), 
in support of the proposition that the facts in this case establish consent. (State's Brief at 27.) 
In Boswell officers in plain clothes identified themselves to defendant, an airline passenger, 
and asked if they could speak to her. Defendant agreed. The officers discussed defendant's 
travel plans, asked to review her ticket, and then asked if a gray tweed suitcase belonged to 
defendant. She answered it did. Thereafter, the officer asked "Would you mind if I take a 
look inside this bag?" The officer testified that defendant answered "yes," then on cross-
examination he clarified that "she said, 'Go ahead.'" Boswell 721 A.2d at 338-39. 
Those circumstances do not exist in Hansen's case. Huntington twice testified that 
when he asked Hansen, "Do you mind if I check," Hansen answered, "yes." When 
Huntington was given the opportunity to clarify the matter, he refused to provide any 
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additional facts, and instead provided conclusory testimony, stated that he did not "recall 
exactly other than it was consent," and admitted he assumed he had consent. (R. 84:38-40.) 
If Huntington's description of the facts, together with his conclusory statements and 
impressions may be sufficient to support consent, the Fourth Amendment protections will 
be rendered meaningless. For this officer — who typically seeks consent by asking "Do you 
mind if I search" - it is irrelevant whether the defendant answers "yes" or "no," so long as 
Huntington believes he has consent to search. That is unacceptable. Huntington's 
impressions and conclusions cannot be sufficient to support consent under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
In this case, the substantial, competent evidence concerning the events and 
circumstances support that Hansen provided an unambiguous, unequivocal and specific 
response to the question, "Do you mind if I check": Hansen objected to the intrusion. 
Huntington's conclusory statements and impressions to the contrary are irrelevant. The court 
of appeals correctly determined that the facts here fail to support consent. 
D. FOR POLICY REASONS. AN OFFICER'S CONCLUSORY STATEMENTS 
AND ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. IF THE LAW ALLOWED 
OFFICERS SIMPLY TO TESTIFY THAT THEY HAD "CONSENT" OR 
"PROBABLE CAUSE" TO SUPPORT THE CONDUCT. THE STANDARD 
WOULD ERODE THE PROTECTIONS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
In reviewing "consent" to search on appeal, this Court is concerned with "ensuring the 
consistent and uniform protection of a fundamental civil liberty," and providing statewide 
standards that guide law enforcement officers and prosecutors in those functions that affect 
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the rights of citizens. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. This Court also is sensitive to the need 
to provide clarity to law enforcement so that it may be effective in its investigative efforts. 
In order that this Court may effectively declare whether certain police conduct is 
lawful or unlawful, this Court and the court of appeals must be able to consider substantial, 
competent evidence on the matter. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, [^42 (considering the circumstances 
of the matter to determine consent). The circumstances of a particular case, as supported by 
the evidence, must justify the legal conclusion. If substantial, competent evidence is lacking, 
the state has failed in its burden of proof and the conduct may not be upheld. 
By way of illustration, imagine an officer who was unable to recall the circumstances 
supporting his conduct, but who testified nevertheless that "Yes, I saw the item in plain 
view"; or "yes, I had exigent circumstances" and "probable cause." If the law allowed a 
warrantless search to be conducted based on conclusory testimony and assumptions, the 
standard would render evidentiary hearings, cross examination, trial court determinations, 
and appellate review meaningless. The standard essentially would allow the officer to dictate 
the result in each case to the trial court, without inquiry as to whether the objective 
circumstances supported the officer's impressions and without any analysis as to whether the 
officer comprehended the law in reaching his conclusions about the matter. See Gates, 426 
U.S. at 239 (a judge may not rely on conclusory statements, since such action would reduce 
his function to a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others). 
Public policy compels the need for "substantial, competent" evidence to support an 
officer's conduct. Here, the trial court and court of appeals had an uncontroverted record of 
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the circumstances surrounding the search. Officer Huntington testified with commendable 
candor. He stated that to obtain consent, he asked if Hansen had "any alcohol, drugs or 
weapons in the vehicle." (R. 84:17.) When Hansen answered "no," to the that question, 
Officer Huntington asked, "Do you mind if I check." (R. 84:17-18, 38-40.) 
According to Huntington, Hansen said, "yes." Both the trial court and the court of 
appeals expressed concern with the testimony and both recognized it was insufficient to 
support consent. (SeeR. 84:18,38-40); Hansen, 2000 UTApp 353. Thereafter, Huntington 
provided only conclusory statements of his impressions. (R. 84:18, 38-40.) When 
Huntington was asked to clarify the matter and to describe the general circumstances 
supporting "consent," he was unable and/or unwilling to do so. (See R. 84:38-40, 43 
(Huntington admitted to the prosecutor that he could not recall what was said to obtain 
consent, other than it was verbal).) Instead, Huntington testified to his assumptions and he 
suggested that Hansen "probably could have said yes, go ahead," but he specifically did not 
recall that Hansen made that statement. (R. 84:38-40.) 
The trial court considered the conclusory statements to be sufficient to support 
consent, while the court of appeals did not. The court of appeals was correct. Huntington's 
testimony on the ultimate issue - without necessary detail - erodes confidence in the 
evidentiary hearing. If Officer Huntington has a definition for "consent" that is not 
consistent with the law, his failure to provide details to support his actions will protect his 
conduct from judicial scrutiny, and his erroneous standards may never be discovered. So 
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long as Huntington may be allowed to testify that consent was provided, as he did in this 
case, he essentially may dictate the ruling in the matter to the trial judge. 
If the law permitted conclusory statements and ambiguities to support a warrantless 
search, the evidentiary standard would eviscerate constitutional protections and make 
appellate review unworkable. Indeed, trial court discretion and appellate review would 
consist simply of "rubber stamping" the officer's impressions and conclusions without 
evidence of the "things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place." 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935. Here, the conclusory statements and impressions were insufficient 
to support the warrantless search. The court of appeals' ruling should be affirmed. 
POINT II. THIS COURT DOES NOT NEED TO DECIDE THE EFFECTS 
OF HAM ON THIS CASE, SINCE THE "CONSENT" AND SEIZURE 
WERE POISONED BY A PRIOR ILLEGALITY, RENDERING THEM 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE SECOND PRONG OF THE 
THURMAN ANALYSIS. 
A. THE CONSENT WAS OBTAINED BY POLICE EXPLOITATION OF A 
PRIOR ILLEGALITY: OFFICER HUNTINGTON DETAINED HANSEN FOR 
FURTHER QUESTIONING WITHOUT REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION. 
Even if this Court finds voluntary consent, it still must assess whether consent was 
poisoned by a prior police illegality. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. If the state fails in its 
burden of proof under either prong ofThurman, the consent is invalid. Id. 
In this case, "consent" came on the heels of an unlawful, level-two detention. See 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987). The unlawful detention poisoned the 
consent to search the car and the resulting seizure of evidence. 
31 
1. Huntington Continued the Detention Beyond the Permissible Scope. 
To begin the analysis, this Court has identified the three levels of a police-citizen 
encounter as follows: 
(a) [Under the first level] an officer may approach a citizen at [any time] and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) [under the second 
level] an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) [and under the third level] an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18 (citing U. S. v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223,230 (5th Cir. 1984)); see 
also Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003,1006 (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v. Munsen. 
821 P.2d 13, 15 n.l (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992)). 
The encounter in this case began as a level-two or three traffic stop. "[A] police 
officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 'incident to a traffic 
violation committed in the officers' presence.1" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (cites omitted); 
State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1992). 
Such an encounter must be limited in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place. "Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Lopez. 873 P.2d 
at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). Both "[t]he length and scope 
of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered 
its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry 
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v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)). 
[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and 
vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. However, once 
the driver has produced a valid driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the 
vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to 
further delay by police for additional questioning." 
State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446,452 (Utah 1996) (cites omitted); Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1131-
32; State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699, 703 (Utah App. 1992). 
If an officer continues to detain the occupants of a vehicle, this Court will make a 
dual inquiry to determine whether continued detention was reasonable. This Court will ask, 
"(1) Was the police officer's action 'justified at its inception'? and (2) Was the resulting 
detention 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in 
the first place?'" Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1131-32 (citing Terrv. 392 U.S. at 19-20); State v. 
Humphrey. 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see Castner. 825 P.2d at 702. If the 
continued detention was not related in scope to the reason for the stop, this Court will assess 
whether the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity beyond that 
which justified the stop, to support continued detention and investigative questioning. 
See Chapman. 921 P.2d at 453. 
In this matter, "Hansen does not dispute the legality of the initial stop and the first part 
of the Terry inquiry is not at issue." Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, (^10. According to the 
record and the findings, Officer Huntington stopped Hansen for an "improper lane change" 
and failure to carry insurance. (R. 84:12); Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, ^3. 
However, Hansen maintained in the court of appeals that the continued detention for 
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further investigative questioning constituted an unlawful seizure; it exceeded the scope and 
the purpose of the traffic stop. See Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, ffl[12-13; see. also State v. 
Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah App. 1994) (trial court's determination regarding the level 
of an encounter is a legal conclusion). In addition, Huntington did not articulate reasonable 
suspicion of serious criminal activity to justify the continued detention. Thus, the drug-
related questioning and resulting search and seizure violated Hansen's rights. 
The court of appeals agreed with Hansen. Hansen, 2000 UTApp353,^|16. It ruled 
"Hansen was illegally detained" when Officer Huntington asked him questions about drugs, 
alcohol, and weapons, and when Huntington "requested consent to search the car." IcL 
The state takes issue with the court of appeals' ruling. It claims the matter 
transformed into a level-one, consensual encounter at the point where Officer Huntington 
requested "consent" to search Hansen's car. "In short, Officer Huntington's verbal warning 
that defendant needed to obtain insurance and his return of defendant's registration and 
driver's license signaled the end of the detention such that a reasonable person would feel 
free to leave." According to the state, Hansen was no longer detained when he provided 
"consent"; he was free to go on about his business. (State's Brief of Petitioner at 37.) The 
state is incorrect, as explained below. 
2. The State Claims the Encounter Transformed from a Level-Two to a Level-One 
Encounter. The Objective Facts Fail to Support the State's Claim. 
In considering whether an encounter has diminished in intensity from a level-two 
detention to a level-one consensual encounter, this Court will review the objective facts from 
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the perspective of a reasonable person. This Court will assess whether the officer 
communicated through words or the import of the situation that defendant was free to go. 
See State v. Higgins. 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994); Johnson. 805 P.2d at 763 (court 
looks to objective facts to determine if person would believe she was free to go); Patefield. 
927 P.2d at 659; State v. Robinette. 685 N.E.2d 762, 770 (Ohio 1997). For example, did 
the officer indicate to detainee that he was finished with his business as it related to the 
justification for the stop, either by issuing a citation/warning, or through some other action? 
(See State's Brief at 36 (the issuance of a warning may signal the end of the detention).) 
Also, this Court will not consider the officer's subjective belief regarding the situation. 
If the officer had an uncommunicated belief that defendant was free to leave, that is 
irrelevant to the analysis. See Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1136-37 (an officer's state of mind is 
irrelevant); Patefield. 927 P.2d at 659; Barnes. 978 P.2d at 1135 (officer's subjective belief 
that defendant was free to walk away was immaterial); see also Robinette. 519 U.S. at 38. 
In this case, the court of appeals correctly determined that while Officer Huntington 
believed he had finished his business with Hansen when he requested "consent" to search 
(R. 84:16-17), the officer did not communicate that belief to Hansen, and the objective facts 
surrounding the matter were such that the reasonable person would not feel free to leave. 
The totality of the circumstances supported continued detention. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, 
1112-17. 
Specifically, Huntington testified that when he requested "consent" to search, Hansen 
was free to go. Yet, at that point, the officer had not completed his business as it related to 
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the stop. Huntington had failed to indicate to Hansen how he intended to resolve the 
"improper lane change." (R. 84:31-34, 43-44.) Under those facts, a reasonable person 
would not feel free to leave. (See State's Brief at 36-37; R. 84:30 (acknowledging that a 
detainee would not feel free to leave before an officer issued a citation or warning).) 
In addition, as Officer Huntington returned the documentation to Hansen, Huntington 
expanded the scope of the detention without justification: He continued investigative 
questioning, and asked about drugs, alcohol, and weapons. Huntington also asked Hansen, 
"Do you mind if I check" for such items in the car. (See R. 84:16-18,37-40); Point I, supra. 
Also, during the continued detention, a second officer arrived on the scene, with 
emergency lights engaged. The second officer stepped out of his car, and stood behind 
Hansen's car. (R. 84:14-15, 37.) 
Under the circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to ignore the 
increase in officer presence, and Huntington's questions, particularly in light of the fact that 
the officer had not indicated how he intended to resolve the "improper lane change." "When 
these factors are combined with a police officer's superior position of authority, any 
reasonable person would have felt compelled to submit to the officer's questioning." State 
v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d at 771 (on remand from Ohio v. Robinette. 519 U.S. 33, the Ohio 
Supreme Court ruled that total circumstances failed to support a level-one encounter). 
In view of the total circumstances, the court of appeals properly determined that 
"Hansen remained seized for Fourth Amendment purposes" when Huntington questioned 
him about alcohol, drugs and weapons, and when Huntington requested "consent" to search. 
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Hansen. 2000 UT App 353,1J16. 
Next, the state argues that the Fourth Amendment does not "require particular 
language, or words at all, to signal the end of a detention." (State's Brief of Petitioner at 37-
38.) The court of appeals recognized that proposition as well. See Hansen, 2000 UT App 
353,H13. 
In this case, at the point where Huntington claimed Hansen was free to leave, the total 
circumstances that made the encounter a level-two detention were still present and 
escalating. That is, from an objective person's perspective, Huntington had not indicated 
how he intended to resolve the improper lane change, his emergency lights were still 
engaged, he continued to ask investigative-type questions, and a second officer had arrived, 
standing behind Hansen's car with emergency lights engaged. (R. 84:14-17, 36-37.) 
The conduct did not give Hansen any indication he was free to go, but communicated 
the opposite - he was not free to leave ~ and indeed was still at risk for receiving a ticket on 
the "improper lane change" — until he answered the additional questions. 
Finally, the state attempts to minimize the improper intrusion by claiming the 
questions could not have taken "more than a few seconds." (State's Brief of Petitioner at 38.) 
That is irrelevant.8 Under the law, a "temporary" or brief detention is improper unless it is 
8
 That argument also is incorrect. As the facts reflect, the unrelated, unlawful 
interrogation facilitated one event after the other, where Hansen answered the questions, 
stepped out of the car, submitted to a frisk search, was subjected to a search of the car, 
answered more questions, was arrested, and was subjected to a search incident to arrest. (R. 
84:19-23, 41-42.) The unrelated, unlawful investigation was intrusive and extensive. 
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supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. 
[Once] the occupants of the vehicle have satisfied the reasons for the initial stop, the 
officer must permit them to proceed." [State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 
App. 1992)] "'Any further temporary detention for investigative questioning after the 
fulfillment of the purpose for the initial traffic stop is justified under the fourth 
amendment only #/the detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal 
activity.'" Id (quoting [State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990)].) 
Patefield, 927 P.2d at 659 (bold emphasis added). Also, "[unsupported] by further probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion, inquiries by the officer to investigate suspicions unrelated to 
the traffic offense unconstitutionally extend the detention beyond the scope of the 
circumstances that rendered it permissible." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135. "[AJn investigative 
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose 
of the stop." Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 49L 500 (1983). At the point where the officer's 
reasonable suspicions are allayed, there is no further reason for the stop, and the officer is 
required to allow the detainee to leave. Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452. If a detention lasts any 
longer than is justified, it is unlawful. 
The court of appeals properly ruled the continued detention here was unlawful; it 
exceeded the scope of the justification for the stop. See Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, HK8-16. 
3. The Officer Failed to Articulate Reasonable Suspicion for the Continued 
Detention. 
An officer may continue to detain a person beyond the justification for the stop if the 
officer has articulated independent facts to support reasonable suspicion of further criminal 
activity. See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453. In this matter, the state does not dispute that 
Officer Huntington failed to articulate any basis to justify the continued detention. (See. 
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State's Brief of Petitioner; see also R. 84:38.) 
Indeed, the state conceded in the court of appeals "that Officer Huntington did not 
have a reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity to justify the 
investigative questions." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^ f 16. Thus, "Hansen was illegally 
detained when Officer Huntington asked him questions that were not reasonably related in 
scope to the traffic violation which justified the initial seizure." Id 
4. Hansen Is Entitled to Suppression of the Evidence Since the Officer Obtained 
"Consent" Through Exploitation of a Prior Illegality. 
Even if this Court finds that the consent to search was voluntary, see supra Point I, 
herein, the "consent" and seizure of evidence were poisoned by the unlawful detention. 
Thus, the evidence discovered in connection with the "consent" must be suppressed. See 
Thurman. 842 P.2d at 1262; Arrovo. 796 P.2d at 688-89. 
"When the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent after an illegal police 
action ..., the prosecution 'has a much heavier burden to satisfy than when proving consent 
to search' which does not follow police misconduct." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687-88. 
This is because in addition to proving a valid and voluntary consent to search, the 
State must also establish the existence of intervening factors which prove that the 
consent was sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct. 
It is well settled that evidence is not subject to exclusion if'"the connection 
between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is 
"so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'"" The Utah Supreme Court has established 
several factors that the reviewing court must examine in evaluating the attenuation 
issue: temporal proximity of the initial illegality and the consent in question, the 
presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal 
misconduct. 
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Ham, 910 P.2d at 440-41 (cites omitted), overruled on other grounds, Bisner. 2001 UT 99, 
W4-46. 
The state has failed to argue "attentuation" in this case. In that regard, the state has 
failed to satisfy its "heavier burden" of proof in the matter. See_ Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687-88. 
In addition, the state is prohibited from arguing attenuation in its reply brief. 
In considering the "attenuation issue," the record in this case reflects that no time 
passed between the continued, illegal detention and the request for consent to search. (R. 
84:16, 38.) Also, there were no intervening circumstances between the unlawful conduct 
and the "consent." (Id.) Hansen's "consent" was procured during the illegal detention. In 
addition, the record reflects that Officer Huntington unlawfully detained Hansen and asked 
further questions for the specific purpose of obtaining consent to search the car. 
Accordingly, Hansen's consent, even if voluntary, was invalid because it was gained by the 
officer's exploitation of his prior illegal conduct. On that basis, all evidence discovered and 
seized as a result of the unlawful conduct must be suppressed. 
This Court may find that consent was poisoned by the prior illegality. The evidence 
obtained in connection therewith must be suppressed. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
CONCERNING THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY CONSTITUTED COERCION. 
As a final matter, the court of appeals considered the totality of the circumstances set 
forth above, including the prior illegality, to determine that consent was coerced. While the 
"coercion" analysis relates to the voluntariness of the consent, see supra. Point I, herein, 
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Hansen has addressed it here, because poison and coercion are intertwined and related. 
With regard to coercion, the court of appeals stated the following: 
[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by 
explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For, no matter how 
subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting "consent" would be no more than a 
pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is 
directed. 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353,1J22 (citing Schneckloth. 412 U.S. 228). 
The state takes issue with the court of appeals1 ruling that consent was coerced. 
It claims the ruling cannot be upheld for the following reasons: the "presumption against 
waiver" standard tainted the coercion analysis; and "detention" may not be a basis for finding 
coerced consent. (State's Brief at 29-30.) 
With regard to the state's claim regarding the "presumption" standard, it is incorrect. 
The court of appeals in this matter specifically considered the totality of the circumstances. 
See Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, }^25. That is, the court of appeals looked to the "details of 
police conduct and the characteristics of the accused, Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 684[,] which 
include 'subtly coerciyepolice questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state 
of the person who consents.' Schnecklotk 412U.S.at229." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353422. 
Any reference in the "coercion" analysis to the "presumption against waiver" was 
inconsequential and constituted dictum. See supra Point I, herein. 
With respect to the state's claim that "detention alone cannot by itself render an 
otherwise voluntary consent involuntary" (State's Brief of Petitioner at 30), the court of 
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appeals did not rely on that factor alone. It looked to the totality of the circumstances, 
including the following: 
Officer Huntington remained at Hansen's vehicle and continued to ask Hansen 
questions, both Officer Huntington and a second armed officer's vehicles remained 
parked behind Hansen with their emergency lights flashing, and the second officer 
remained outside his vehicle throughout the encounter. Finally, Officer Huntington 
did not make any indication to Hansen as to how he intended to handle the improper 
lane change before he asked Hansen if he had any alcohol, weapons, or drugs in the 
vehicle. Officer Huntington merely told Hansen to have his insurance agent call the 
Division of Motor Vehicles, and he returned Hansen's license and registration. 
Hansen, 2000 UTApp 353415. Also, 
[T]he circumstances surrounding the request to search made the request subtly 
coercive. Specifically, Officer Huntington had only issued a warning regarding the 
lack of insurance and he had not taken any action regarding the improper left turn. 
Therefore, a reasonable person would not have felt that their consent, if given, was 
a voluntary act of free will because Officer Huntington could have cited Hansen for 
the improper lane change if Hansen was uncooperative regarding the search. See 
Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) 
("[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving 
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily 
given....") (emphasis added). 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353,1J24.9 The court of appeals' analysis supports coercion. It should 
9The state claims the factors set forth in State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 
1980), support that consent was not coerced. (State's Brief at 28.) The Whittenback factors 
include the following: "[1] the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; [2] 
the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; [3] a mere request to search; [4] 
cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and [5] the absence of deception or trick on the part 
of the officer." Id 
Since "coercion" is assessed under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis, the 
Whittenback factors should serve as a starting place for the analysis. See Robinette. 519 U.S. 
at 39 (Court refuses to apply rigid tests under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis). 
With respect to factors [1] and [2], Officer Huntington testified that as he returned 
Hansen's license and registration, a second officer pulled in behind Hansen's car with 
emergency lights engaged, and he stepped out of his patrol car to stand behind Hansen's car. 
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be affirmed on review. Where the consent is coerced, it is deemed unlawful. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Hansen respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the court of appeals' determination that the state failed to prove valid consent. 
SUBMITTED this ^ day of Cl+^+M^r 2002. 
LINDA M. JONES (J 
OTIS STERLING III 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Both officers were in uniform and armed. The increased intensity supports an exhibition of 
authority and force by the officers, under factors [1] and [2]. 
With respect to factors [3] and [4], Officer Huntington's testimony concerning the 
facts supports that Hansen objected to the officer's request to search. See supra. Point I. 
Those factors support coercion. And finally, with respect to factor [5], at the time Officer 
Huntington requested "consent" to search, he had not indicated to Hansen how he intended 
to resolve the "improper lane change." He left the impression that to avoid a citation, Hansen 
was required to cooperate. Those facts support manipulation and deception on the part of 
Officer Huntington. Under Whittenback and the totality of the circumstances, the record 
supports coercion. 
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1587). Moreover, "it is 
defendant who procures a judgment against 
him upon an indictment to be set aside may 
be tried anew upon the same indictment, or 
upon another indictment, for the same of-
fense of which he had been convicted." Ball 
v. United States, 163 IIS. 662, 665, 16 S.Ct 
1192,1195, 41 LuE± 300 (1896). 
- f 17 The rationale underlying this policy is 
clean " 4[i]t would be a high price indeed for 
society to pay were every accused granted 
immunity from punishment because of any 
defect sufficient to constitute reversible error 
in the proceedings leading to conviction/n 
Burks, 437 US. at 15, 98 S.Ct 2141 (quoting 
Tateo,.ZTI US. at 466, 34 S.Ct. 1587). Fur-
ther, ''reversal for trial error, as distin-
guished from evidentiary insufficiency .. is 
a determination that a defendant has been 
convicted through a judicial process which is 
defective in some fundamental aspect, e.g., 
. . . incorrect instructions." Id ,fWhen this 
occurs, the accused has a strong interest in 
obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt 
free from error, just as society maintains a 
valid concern for insuring that die guilty are 
punished/' I<L Because we conclude that the 
juvenile court committed a procedural error 
in utilizing the clear and convmcmg standard 
in C.S.B.'s delinquency proceeding, we re-
verse and remand, noting that sucn a remand 
does not violate the Due Process Clause of 
the United States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
518 The juvenile court erred when it used 
the clear and convincing standard in its writ-
ten findings for C.S.B.'s delinquency hearing. 
Therefore, we reverse. Additionally, we con-
clude that our authority to remand is clear, 
and, in this instance, that remand does not 
violate C.S.B.'s Fifth Amendment double 
jeopardy protections. 
If19 We remand :his case to the juvenile 
court for further appropriate written find-
ings, wherein the court 3 instructed to apply 
the appropriate standard of beyond a reason-
able doubt. The juvenile court may accom-
plish this in its discretion tnrougn reevaluat-
ing the evidence, conducting a new trial, or 
other means deemed appropriate. We fur-
ther direct the juvenile court to explain on 
STATED HANSEN Utair H35" 
Cite as 17 PJd 1135 (UtabApp. 2000) 
quite clear that a the record its reasons for choosing the di-
rection it takes. 
f 20 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. 
BENCH, Judge, and JAMES Z. DAVIS, 
Judge. 
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v. 
Shayne M. HANSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 990987-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 14. 2000. 
Defendant pleaded guilty in the District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Leslie A. Lew-
is, J., to illegal possession oi a controlled 
substance. He appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Davis, J., held that: 1) officer's ques-
tions about drugs were outside scope of traf-
fic stop, and (2) defendant's consent to search 
his car following illegal traffic stop was not 
voluntary. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Greenwood, P.J., filed an opinion concur-
ring in the result 
1. Criminal Law <s=»1134(3) 
In determining whether a defendant's 
consent to a search following illegal police 
activity is valid under the Fourth Amend-
ment, an appellate court looks to: (1) the 
voluntariness of the consent, and (2) whether 
the consent was obtained by police exploita-
tion of the prior illegality. U.S.CA- Const. 
Amend. 4. 
2. Criminal Law s=1134(3), 1158(2) 
A trial court's ultimate conclusion that 
consent to search was voiuntarv or involun-
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tary is reviewed on appeal for correctness; 
however, its underlying factual findings will 
not be set aside unless they are found to be 
clearly erroneous. U.S.C.A. Const-Amend. 4. 
3. Criminal Law <3=>1134(3) 
In reviewing the legality of a traffic stop, 
an appellate court considers two questions: 
whether the officer's action was justified at 
its mception, and whether it was reasonably 
related m scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference m the first place. 
U.S.C.A. Const-Amend. 4. 
4. Automobiles e=>349(3) 
A police officer is constitutionally justi-
fied in stopping a vehicle if the stop is inci-
dent to a traffic violation committed in the 
officer's presence. U S.C.A. Const-Amend. 4. 
5. Automobiles c=>349(17) 
Once a traffic stop is made, the deten-
tion must be temporary and ±ast no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Automobiles c=>349( 18) 
An officer conducting a routine traffic 
stop may request a drivers license and vehi-
cle registration, conduct a computer check, 
and issue a citation, however, once the driver 
has produced a valid license and evidence of 
entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be 
allowed to proceed on his wa\, without bemg 
subject to further delay by police for addi-
tional questioning. U.S.CA- Const-Amend. 
4. 
7. Automobiles c»349(18) 
Following conclusion of traffic stop, in-
vestigative questioning that further detains 
the driver must be supported oy reasonable 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity 
U.S.CA Const-Amend. 4. 
8. Arrest <3=*S3.5(4) 
"Reasonable suspicion" required to val-
idate Terry stop means susDiaon based on 
specific, articulable facts drawn from the to-
tality of the circumstances facmg the officer 
at the time of the stop US.C-A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
See puoucauon Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions 
9. Arrest <s>68(4) 
Once a person is seized for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, the seizure does not 
cease simply because the police formulate an 
uncommunicated intention that the seized 
person may go on his way; for the seizure to 
end, it must be clear to the seized person, 
either from the words of an officer or from 
the clear import of the circumstances, that 
the person is at liberty to go about his busi-
ness. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 4. 
10. Automobiles <s>349(10,18) 
During traffic stop, defendant remained 
seized under the Fourth Amendment after 
police officer returned drivers license and 
registration, and accordingly, a reasonable 
articulable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity was required to justify subsequent 
investigative questioning about drugs, as 
such questions were outside scope of jutial 
stop, a reasonable person in defendant's posi-
tion would not believe that he was free to 
leave, where officer remained at the car and 
asked questions, a second police vehicle was 
present, and officer did not address one -of 
the reasons for the initial stop. U.S C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4; U CA.1953. 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) 
11. Searches and Seizures <s>182 
A defendant's consent to a search follow-
ing illegal police activity is valid under the 
Fourth Amendment only if both of the fol-
lowing tests are met: (1) the consent was 
given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not 
obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality U.S.CA. Const-Amend. 4. 
12. Searches and Seizures <s=>194 
It is the state's burden to prove that a 
consent to search was voluntarily given; if 
the state fails to meet this burden, the evi-
dence is deemed inadmissible against the 
defendant U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4. 
13. Criminal Law <s=>1134(2) 
In determining wnether consent to 
search was voluntarily given, an appellate 
court will look to the totality of all the cir-
cumstances. U.S.CA- ConstAmend. 4. 
STATE v. HANSEN 
Ctt*aal7 PJd 1135 (UBhApp. 2000) 
Utah H37 
14. Searches and Seizures <3»182 
Defendant's consent to search his car for 
drugs following illegal traffic stop was not 
freely and voluntarily given; officer was coer-
cive and a reasonable person would not have 
felt free to ignore the request, as officer only 
addressed one of the two reasons for the stop 
when the request was made, which would 
indicate to defendant that he could be ated 
for the other reason if he was uncooperative. 
U.S.C.A. ConstJjnend. 4; U.CJL1953, 58-
S7-8(2Xa)(i). 
Linda M. Jones and Otis Sterling, EH, Salt 
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City, for appellant. 
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111 Defendant Shayne Michael Hansen 
(Hansen) appeals his conviction for illegal 
possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998). 
BACKGROUND 
112 On December 11, 1998, Officer Bruce 
Huntington of the Midvale City Police De-
partment was driving behind Hansen. Offi-
cer Huntington initiated a computer check of 
Hansen's vehicle with the Utah Division of 
Motor Venicles. While Officer Huntington 
waited for the results of the .computer check, 
he observed Hansen make an improper left 
turn.1 After Officer Huntington observed 
the turn, the computer check revealed that 
Hansen's car was uninsured Due to these 
violations, Officer Huntington decided-tq stop 
1, Hansen completed his left turn bv entering the 
right lane rather than the extreme left-hand 
lane, presumably in vioianon of Utah Code Ann 
J 4J-6-oo11998) 
the vehicle, and he activated his overhead 
emergency lights. Hansen pulled off the 
road and stopped m the pariang lot of a 
convenience store. Officer Huntington 
parked directly behind Hansen.2 
13 Officer Huntington, dressed m uni-
form and carrying a sidearm, exited his pa-
trol car and confronted Hansen. Officer 
Huntington told Hansen that he stopped him 
because of the improper lane change and lack 
of insurance. Hansen admitted that the did 
not have any insurance and stated that he 
could not afford insurance. Officer Hunting-
ton requested Hansen's driver's license and 
registration, and returned to his patrol car to 
run a computer check on Hansen. After 
approximately five minutes, the computer 
check revealed that Hansen's license was 
valid, and Hansen did not have any outstand-
ing warrants. Officer Huntington then exit-
ed his patrol car and returned to Hansen. 
While Officer Huntington was walking oack 
to Hansen s vehicle, another officer pullea 
into the pariang lot This second officer 
parked next to Officer Huntington's car. got 
out of his patrol car, and remained oy the 
patrol cars The emergency lights on both 
patrol cars were flashing, and they remained 
flasning throughout the encounter 
14 Upon returning to Hansen s vemcie. 
Officer Huntington told Hansen that state 
law required him to have automobile insur-
ance, and Hansen needed to have an insur-
ance agent mail proof of insurance to the 
Division of Motor Vehicles Officer Hunt-
ington did not say anything to Hansen re-
garding the improper lane change Officer 
Huntington then returned Hansen's drivers 
license and registration, however. Officer 
Huntington did not tell Hansen that ie was 
free to leave. Instead, Officer Huntington 
asked Hansen if he had any alcohol, weap-
ons, or drugs in his venicle. Hansen replied 
that he did not have any such items. Officer 
Huntington then asked Hansen. "Do you 
mind if I cneck?"3 Officer Huntington :esu-
2. It is not clear from the record wnether Officer 
Huntinston impeded Hansen s abiiin to drive otf 
when he parited behmd Hansen 
3. Officer Huntington testified with commendable 
candor that It is my practice to ask tnem ror 
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fled that Hansen responded 'Tes." 4 
115 Officer Huntington then told Hansen 
and his passenger to step out of the car, and 
Officer Huntington directed them to stand 
next to the other officer. Officer Huntington 
conducted a search of the car where he found 
a homemade billy club and a marijuana pipe 
on the floor of the driver's area of the car. 
Officer Huntington arrested Hansen and 
searched him incident to the arrest. During 
the search of Hansen, Officer Huntington 
found a substance he suspected to be meth-
amphetamine. Hansen was later charged 
with possession of a controlled substance m 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1998), and unlawful possession of 
drug parapnemaiia m violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). 
116 Prior to trial. Hansen moved to sup-
press evidence ootained m the searches, 
claiming tnat Officer Hunungton illegally de-
tamed him and that ne did not voluntarily 
consent to the searcii of his car The trial 
court denied Hansen's motion to suppress, 
concluding that the evidence was lawfully 
seized oecause u[a]t the time consent was 
obtained, there was no seizure for Fourth 
Amendment purposes oecause detendant was 
free to leave,' and "[defendant's consent to 
search was freely and voluntarily given." 
Hansen later entered a conditional guilty 
plea to unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance. Hansen now appeals the trial 
court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1,2] H7 Hansen alleges that the trial 
court erred m denying his motion to suppress 
because Officer Hunungton s search violated 
consent bv stating Do vou have anv alcohol 
weapons or drugs in the vehicle5 ind if thev 
sav no I say Well ao vou mind if * check5 
4. The record indicates that Officer Huntington 
was unsure about Hansen s response For exam-
ple during ooth direct and cross examination 
Officer Hunungton testified Jiat Hansen re-
sponded ves to the question Do \ou mind if I 
check5 However in ooth jistances the court 
intenecteo bv asking Officer 4untington f Han-
sen said ves he minded Officer Hunungton 
responded to tne court s quesuons bv stating that 
Hansen said ves I could have consent. .How-
ever Officer Hunungton later admitted thai he 
his Fourth Amendment right against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Specifically, 
Hansen argues that his consent to search 
was not valid because it was obtained 
through Officer Huntington's exploitation of 
an illegal seizure, and his consent was not 
voluntarily given.5 
[Bjecause the determination of whether an 
encounter with law enforcement officers 
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment Ui "calls for consistent appli-
cation from one police encounter to the 
next, regardless of the particular individu-
al's response to the actions of the po-
lice," '" such determination is a legal con-
clusion that we review for correctness. 
Salt Lake City v Ray, 2000 UT App 55, 18, 
998 P.2d 274 (citations omitted). Similarly, 
the trial court's ultimate conclusion that con-
sent was voluntary or involuntary is reviewed 
for correctness. See State v Thurmaru 846 
?2d 1256, 1271 (Utan 1993). However, 
"[T]he trial court's underlying factual find-
ings will not be set aside unless they are 
found to be clearly erroneous.'1 Id. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Nature of the police encounter 
*8 Hansen argues that the trial court 
erred in its conclusion that, at the tame the 
consent was obtained, there was no seizure 
for Fourth Amendment purposes because 
Hansen was free to leave 
The Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution guarantees the "right 
of the people to be secure m their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." UJSL 
Gonst. amend. IV The United States 3u-
did not remember Hansen s exact response re-
garding his question— T)o vou mind if I check*" 
5. In determining whether a defendant s consent 
to a search following illegal police act iv i ty^ 
valid under the Fourth Amendment we took to 
d) the voluntariness of the consent and fii) 
whether the consent was obtained bv police ex-
pioitauon ot the prior illegality See Stale v 
Thurman 346 P 2d 1256'1262 (Utah 1993) 
Therefore we begin our analvsis with the issue of 
whether Officer Huntington s seizure was illegal 
and then analvze whether Hansen s consent was 
voluntary 
STATE v. HANSEN 
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preme Court has held that "stopping an 
automobile and detaining its occupants 
constituted] a seizure" within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment, "even though 
the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief." Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct 1391, 
59 LJ3(L2d 660 (1979). Thus, u[a]lthough 
a person has a lesser expectation of priva-
cy in a car than in his or her home, one 
does not lose the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment while m an automobile/' 
State v. Schlosser. 774 PJ2d 1132, 1135 
(Utah 1989) (citation omitted). 
State u Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 
1994) (alteration m original). 
[3,4] 19 "In reviewing the legality of a 
traffic stop, we consider two questions: 
<[W]hether the officer's action was justified at 
its inception, and wnether it was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place.'" 
State v. PatefieUL 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah 
CtApp.1996) (alteration m original) (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20. 88 S.Ct 1868, 
1879, 20 L.EcL2d 889 (1968)), accord Lopez 
873 P.2d at 1131-32. With respect to the 
first question, a ponce officer is constitution-
ally justified in stopping a venicle if the stop 
is "incident to a traffic violation committed in 
the officers' presence " Staze v Talbot 792 
P.2d 489, 491 (Utah CtApp.1990); see also 
State v MarsnalL 791 P.2d 880, 881-83 
(Utah CtApp.1990), State v Sierra. 754 P.2d 
972, 975 (Utan CtApp.1988) 
1! 10 Here, Hansen was seized by Officer 
Huntington when ne was stopped for the 
improper lane change and lack of insurance. 
It is clear that Officer Huntington was justi-
fied in seizing Hansen because Hansen com-
mitted two traffic violations in the officer's 
presence. Consequently, Hansen does not 
dispute the legality of the initial stop and the 
first part of the Terry inquiry is not at issue. 
[5-8] U 11 The second auestion in re-
viewing the legahtv of a traffic stop is wheth-
er the stoo was reasonaDlv elated in scope 
to the trflffir violation wnicn justified it in the 
first place. See PaiefieuL 927 P.2d at 657. 
"Once a traffic stoD is made, the detention 
"must be. temporary and last no longer than 
is necessaryxo effectuate the purpose of the 
stop.'" Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting 
Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct 
1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). Both "[t]he 
length and scope of the detention must be 
'strictly tied to and justified by the circum-
stances which rendered its initiation permis-
sible." State v Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 
(Utah 1991) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-
20, 88 S.Ct 1868). Therefore, 
[a]n officer conducting a routine traffic 
stop may request a driver's license and 
vehicle registration, conduct a computer 
check, and issue a citation. United States 
v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 
1988). However, once the driver has pro-
duced a valid license and evidence of enti-
tlement to use the vehicle, "he must be 
allowed to proceed on his way, without 
being subject to further delay by police for 
additional questioning " Id-
State v Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 
CtApp.1990). "Investigative questioning 
that further detains the driver must be sup-
ported by reasonable suspicion of more seri-
ous criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion 
means suspicion based on specific, articulable 
facts drawn from the totality of the circum-
stances facing the officer at the time of the 
stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. 
[9] 112 Here, Hansen claims that he 
was illegally seized at the time the alleged 
consent was obtained because Officer Hunt-
ington engaged in investigative questioning 
without reasonaole suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity. The State counters that 
when Officer Huntington gave Hansen a 
warning and returned his license and regis-
tration, the encounter between Officer Hunt-
ington and Hansen ceased to be a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
Under Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct 
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its proge-
ny, there are three levels of police-citizen 
encounters, each requiring a different de-
gree of justification under the Fourth 
Amendment. State v Munseru 821 P.2d 
13, 15 n. 1 (Utah ApD.1991), cert denied. 
843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992) The first level 
occurs when an officer approaches and 
questions a suspect An officer may stop 
and question a person at any time so long 
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as that person "is not detained against his 
[or her] will" Id The next level is 
reached when an officer temporarily seizes 
a person. In order to legally effect a 
temporary seizure, the officer must have 
"articulable suspicion" that the suspect has 
or is about to commit a crime, and the 
detention must be limited in scope. Id 
The third level is arrest, which requires 
probable cause for the officer to believe 
that a crime has been or is about to be 
committed. Id. 
Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 PJ2d 1003,1006 
(Utah CtApp.1996) (alteration in original). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has declared: 
Not every encounter between a police offi-
cer and a citizen is a seizure. A person is 
seized under the Fourth Amendment 
when, considering the totality of the cir-
cumstances, the police conduct would have 
communicated to a reasonaole person that 
the person was not free to decline the 
officer's requests or otherwise terminate 
the encounter and go aoout his or her 
business. 
State v. Higgins, 384 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 
1994) (internal citations omitted). 
Illustrating this standard, the United 
States Supreme Court noted: "Examples 
of circumstances that mignt indicate a sei-
zure, even where the person did not at-
tempt to leave, would be the threatening 
presence of several officers, the display of 
a weapon by an officer, some physical 
touching of the person of the citizen, or the 
use of language or tone of voice indicating 
that compliance with the officer's request 
might be compelled." 
State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah 
CtApp.1996) (quoting United Stales v. Men-
denhall 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct 1870, 
1877, 64 L.£d.2d 497 (1980)). Furthermore, 
[o]nce a person is seized for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, the seizure does not 
cease simply oecause the police formulate 
an uncommunicated intention that the 
seized person may go on his or her way. 
For the seizure to end. it must ve clear to 
the seized person, either from the words of 
an officer or from the clear import of the 
circumstances, that the person is at liberty 
to go about his or her business. 
Higgins. 884 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis added). 
[10] 113 In the present case, the trial 
court concluded that the detention did not 
exceed the scope of the traffic stop and that 
at the time Hansen consented to the search, 
there was no seizure for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. We disagree. The record clearly 
indicates that neither the words of Officer 
Huntington nor the clear import of the cir-
cumstances would have communicated to a 
reasonable person that the person was free 
to decline the officers requests, terminate 
the encounter, and go about his or her busi-
ness. Although Officer Huntington returned 
Hansen's drivers license and registration, 
given the surrounding circumstances, this act 
alone would not have communicated to a 
reasonable person that he or sne was free to 
leave. See United States v. Saridovai, 29 
F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir.1994) tuIn the context 
of traffic stops this Circuit has adopted as an 
indicium of a seizure the officers taking of 
necessary documentation (drivers license 
and vehicle registration) from a dnver, and 
we have also considered as a necessary (but 
not always sufficient) condition of the termi-
nation of that seizure the officers return of 
such documentation. "). For example, af-
ter Officer Huntington returned Hansen's li-
cense and registration. Officer Huntington 
did not say anything to Hansen that would 
have indicated that Hansen was free to go. 
We recognize that an officer is not required 
to inform a detainee that they are free to go, 
see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38, 117 
S.Ct. 417, 421, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); how-
ever, such a statement would have supported 
the trial court's conclusion that Hansen was 
not seized at the time he gave consent See 
United States v. Torres-Guevara. 147 F.3d 
1261, 1265 (10th Cir.1998) (stating defendant 
was not seized for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, in part, because officers told defen-
dant she was free to leave): United States v. 
Gregory, 79 F.3d 973. 979 (10th Cir.1996) 
("Although not prerequisites, in determining 
whether consent is voluntary when given fol-
lowing the return of defendant's documents, 
we IOOK at sucn factors as wnether the officer 
informed the defendant that he was free 3D 
leave the scene or that he could refuse to 
STATE v. HANSEN 
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give consent"); United States v McSwavru 
29 F.3d 558, 563 (10th Cir.1994) (same). 
114 Not only did Officer Huntington fail 
to communicate to Hansen that he was free 
to leave, the question that Officer Huntington 
asked Hansen—"Do you have any drugs, al-
cohol or weapons in the car?"—communicat-
ed the message that Hansen was not free to 
leave. This question, although not directly 
accusatory, was clearly investigatory, indicat-
ing that Officer Huntington suspected that 
Hansen was engaged in some sort of illegal 
activity. Therefore, investigatory questions 
such as the one asked here actually cut 
against the proposition that a reasonable per-
son would feel that the initial seizure has 
ended and that he or she is now free to 
terminate the encounter Cf Sandoval 29 
F 3d at 542 (stating that the crucial predicate 
to a voluntary police citizen encounter was 
missing because u[a]t no point did the nature 
of those inquiries Laoout defendant's drug 
mvolvement] change the climate so that the 
reasonaole listener would Mew participation 
m the exchange as ireeiy termlnable,,), 
Washington v Soto-Garcia 68 WasLApp 
20, 841 P.2d 1271, 1273-74 J992) (holding 
that progressive intrusion into defendant's 
privacy was of such a nature that a reason-
able person would not Deheve that he or she 
was free to end the encounter) 
H 15 In addition to Officer Huntington's 
words, the clear import of the circumstances 
m the present case would not have indicated 
to a reasonable person that he or she was 
free to leave. Officer Huntington remained 
at Hansen's vehicle and continued to ask 
Hansen questions, both Officer Huntington 
and a second armed officer's vehicles re-
mained parked bemnd Hansen with their 
emergency lights flashing, and the second 
officer remained outside his venicle through-
out the encounter Finally, Officer Hunting-
ton did not make any indication to Hansen as 
to how he intended to handle the improper 
lane change before he asked Hansen if he 
had any alcohol weapons, or drugs in the 
vehicle. Officer Huntington mereiv told 
Hansen to have his insurance agent call the 
Division of Motor Vemcies, ana he returned 
Hansen s license and registration. Because 
of the clear import of the circumstances, 
especially the fact that Officer Huntington 
had not addressed one of the reasons for the 
initial stop, a reasonable person would not 
have felt tree to terminate the encounter and 
proceed on his or her way. 
1116 Due to the factors discussed above, 
we find that Hansen remained seized for 
Fourth Amendment purposes when, and be-
cause, Officer Huntington asked him whether 
there was alcohol, drugs, or weapons in the 
vehicle. Likewise Hansen was seized for 
Fourth Amendment purposes when Officer 
Huntington requested consent to search the 
car. The State concedes that Officer Hunt-
ington did not have a reasonable articulable 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity to 
justify the investigative questions There-
fore, Hansen was illegally detained when Of-
ficer Huntington asked mm questions that 
were not reasonably related m scope to the 
traffic violation which justified the initial sei-
zure. See United States i Walker 933 F 2d 
812, 816 (10th Or 1991) 'holding that defen-
dant was unreasonably seized under Fourth 
Amendment when officer detained him to ask 
questions unrelated in scoDe to the reasons 
that justified the initial traffic stop) 
H. Voluntariness of Consent 
117 We now turn to the issue of whether 
Hansen s consent to searcn was valid despite 
the illegality of Officer Huntington s seizure. 
A warrantless search is a per se Fourth 
Amendment violation unless the State can 
establish one of the " 'few specifically es-
tablished and well-delineated exceptions.'" 
State v Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684. 687 (Utah 
1990) (quoting Katz v United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct 507. 514,19 L.EcL2d 
576 (1967) (citations omitted)), accord 
State v. Sepulveaa 842 ?M 913, 918 (Utah 
App.1992). One of the clearly established 
exceptions is a consent. Arroyo 796 P.2d 
at 687, Sewdveda, 842 P.2d at 918 
State v Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utan Ct 
App.1996). 
[11-13] «118 U[A] defendant's consent to 
a searcn following illegal Dohce activity is 
valid under the Fourth Amendment only if 
both of the following tests are met. u; The 
consent was given voluntarily, and \W the 
consent was not obtained DV police exploita-
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tion of the prior illegality." State v. Tkur-
maru 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utan 1993); see 
also State v Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684. 688 (Utah 
1990). uIt is the State's burden to prove that 
a consent was voluntarily given If the 
State fails to meet this burden, the evidence 
is deemed inadmissible against the defen-
dant," Ham, 910 P.2d at 439: accord Thur-
man, 846 ?2d at 1263; State v. Robinson, 
797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah CtApp.1990). This 
court has adopted the following analytical 
framework to determine whether the State 
has met its burden of proving that consent 
was voluntarily given: 
'(1) There must be clear and positive testi-
mony that the consent was ^equivocal 
and specific" and "freely ana intelligently 
given", (2) the government must prove 
consent was given without duress or coer-
cion, express or implied; and (3) [when 
evaluating these first two standards, we] 
indulge every reasonade presumption 
against the waiver of fundamental constitu-
tional rights and there must be convincing 
evidence that such ngnts were waived/ 
Ham, 910 P.2d at 439 (citations omitted) 
(alterations in original) In determining 
whether consent was voluntarily given we 
will look to the "totality of all the circum-
stances " Scnnecicloth v Buszamonte, 412 
U.S. 218. 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed2d 
854 (1973), accord Ham 910 P2d at 439. 
[14] * 19 As stated aoove, Hansen was 
illegally seized at the time Officer Hunting-
ton requested consent to search Hansen's 
vehicle. Therefore, for the evidence discov-
ered m the search to be admissible, Hansen's 
consent if given, must have been voluntary, 
and the consent must not have been obtained 
by police exploitation of the pnor illegality. 
The trial court concluded that Hansen's "con-
sent to search was freely and voluntarily 
given " 6 We disagree for the following rea-
sons. 
120 First, Officer Huntington's testimo-
ny was neither clear nor positive regarding 
Hansen s response to his second question. 
See Ham, 910 P.2d at 439 (requiring testimo-
ny that consent was unequivocal ana specific 
6. The trial court did not majce anv conclusion 
regarding the second tactor—wnetner the con-
sent was obtained bv police expioitauon of the 
•- and freely and intelligently given). Sperifi-
 cally, the following colloquies took place: 
1
 Q. [Prosecutor] And then you asked, "Do 
1
 you mind if I check?" 
A. [Officer Huntangton] Uh-huh. 
~ Q. And what was his response to that 
question? 
A. He said yes. 
Q. [Court] Yes, he minded? 
1 A- Yes, I could have consent to search. 
t 
Q. [Defense Counsel] Do you recall spe-
" afically what you said to him? 
A. Not specifically. 
> Q. Do you have any idea? 
A. I would imagine that I stated: "Do 
{ you have any alconol, drugs or weapons m 
 the vehicle?" 
i Q. He said no? 
A. He said no. Do you mind if I check? 
; Q. Okay. 
A. And then he said yes. 
| Q. [Court] He said? 
[ Q. [Defense Counsel] He says yes? 
A. [Officer Huntington] Yes. 
! Q. [Court] Do you mind if I check—and 
I he says yes7 
A. Well, do you mind if I check and then 
; yes, he gave me consent. Sorry. 
Q. [Defense Counsel] What did he say? 
1
 A. What did he say? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. I don't recall exactly other than it was 
consent 
Q. So you don't recall his exact words? 
A. Not exactly. 
1121 Officer Huntington testified twice 
that he asked Hansen, "Do .you mind if I 
check?" and Hansen responaed, "Yes-" The 
court clearly realized the import of officer 
Huntington s testimony and interrupted the 
attorneys in an effort to cianfy Officer finnt-
pnor illegality—because the tnal court conclud-
ed, erroneously that there was no illegality pre-
ceding defendant s alleged consent to search- 1 J 
STATE v. HANSEN 
ate a* 17 P-3d 1133 (UtahApp. 2000) 
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ington's testimony. However, Officer Hunt-
ington's responses to the court's questions 
were conclusory rather than "dear and posi-
tive testimony" that Hansen's reply was 
u
 *unequivocal and specific'" Harru 910 P.2d 
at 439 (citations omitted). Moreover, Officer 
Huntington admitted that he did not recall 
Hansen's exact words. Therefore, we hold 
that the trial court's determination that the 
testimony was clear and positive that Han-
sen's response was unequivocal and specific 
was incorrect. To the extent its determina-
tion amounted to a finding of fact, it was 
clearly erroneous. 
122 The Ham analytical framework re-
quires us to next address whether Hansen's 
response was freely and intelligently given 
and obtained without duress or coercion, ex-
press or implied7 See Harru 910 P.2d at 439. 
[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
require that a consent not be coerced, by 
explicit or implicit means, by implied 
threat or covert force. For. no matter how 
subtly the coercion was applied, the result-
ing "consent" would be no more than a 
pretext for the unjustified police intrusion 
against which the Fourth Amendment is 
directed. 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 22S. 93 S.Ct. 2041. 
In examining all the surrounding circum-
stances to determine if in fact the consent 
to search was coerced, a court must take 
7. Our colleague suggests that our analysis should 
conclude with our ruling that the trial court 
incorrectly determined that the testimony was 
clear and positive that Hansen s response to the 
officers second question was unequivocal and 
specific. 
While we may elect to forego further analysis 
in cases where one or more decided issues may 
arguably be dispositive, we are not obliged to do 
so. Indeed. Lhere are numerous circumstances 
under wmch we mav elect to reach an issue that 
arguablv need not be addressed in order to re-
solve the case. Our election to treat moot issues 
which are of significant public import and likely 
to recur, even wnere the issue is not likely to 
evade judicial review, rinds a particulariv appro-
priate analog JI this case See, e.° , In re S.L.. 
1999 UT App 390, " 40 995 P 2d 17 (reaching 
merits of issue capable of mdicial review because 
it was of significant puohc import and was likely 
to recur) cert aeniea. 4 P 3d 1239 (Utan 2000); 
W. di G. Co. \ Redevelopment Agency, 302 P.2d 
755, 765 (Utan C L A D P . 1 9 9 0 ) > addressing issue, 
even Ltiougn otner issue dispositive, because "it 
is or wide concern it sigmficandy affects the 
into account both the details of police con-
duct and the characteristics of the accused, 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 684[,] which include 
"subtly coercive police questions, as well as 
the possibly vulnerable subjective state of 
the person who consents." Schneckloth. 
412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. at 2049. 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah 
CtApp.1990) (emphasis added). 
H 23 The present case is quite similar to 
Ohio v. Robinette. 80 Ohio St3d 234, 685 
N.E.2d 762 (1997). In Robinette. an officer 
stopped the defendant for a speeding viola-
tion. See id at 764. The officer issued the 
defendant a verbal warning for the speeding 
violation, and returned the defendant's driv-
er's license. See id The officer then said to 
the defendant. "One question before you get 
gone [sic]: are you earning any illegal con-
traband in your car? Any weapons of any 
kind, drugs, anything like that?" Id When 
defendant responded that he did not have 
any contraband in the car, the officer asked if 
he could search the vehicle. See id The 
defendant answered "yes" to the officer's 
request. See id On remand from the Su-
preme Court of the United States, see Ohio 
v. Robinette. 519 U.S. 33. 117 S.Ct. 417. 136 
L.EdJ2d 347 (1996), the Supreme Court of 
Ohio looked at the totality of the circum-
stances to determine whether a reasonable 
public interest, and it is likely to recur in a 
similar manner '); cf. State v. Rodnguez-Lopi. 
954 P.2d 1290, 1294 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1998) 
(Davis. J., concurring) (addressing issue because 
"{Yjhis situation is somewhat analogous to a de-
terrmnauon of whetner to reacn a moot issue '). 
We mav also analyze an issue to enable the 
supreme court to address that issue on review. 
Cf. State v. Maguire, 957 P.2d 598. O00 (Utah 
1998) {strung that issue was outside scope of 
review because court of appeals did not reach 
issue). We may also wish to provide guidance 
for further proceedings. See, e.g.. State v. James, 
819 P2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991) ("Issues that are 
fullv briefed on appeal and are likeiv to be pre-
sented on remand should be addressed by [an 
appellate] court. '). State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 
108 (Utah 1988) (addressing issue m interest of 
judicial economv, since issue likeiv to recur, to 
provide trial court with guidance;: Atlas Corv \. 
Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P 2d 225. 231 (Utan 1987) 
(same); Vizaie v Belmont Springs, 916 P 2d 359 
363 (Utah C;.App.i996> (addressing issue in in-
terest of judicial economy, even tnough case de-
cided on other grounds;. 
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person would have believed that they could 
refuse to answer further auesuons and leave 
See Robinette. 685 N.EJd at 769. The court 
then ruled that 
[the officer's] words did not give Robinette 
any indication that he was iree to go, but 
rather implied just the opposite—that Ro-
binette was not free to go until he an-
swered [the officer's] additional questions. 
The timing of [the officers] immediate 
transition from giving RoDinette the warn-
ing for speeding into questioning regard-
ing contraband and the request to search 
is troubling "The transition between 
detention and a consentual [sic] exchange 
can be so seamless that the untrained eye 
may not notice that it has occurred. The 
undetectability of that transition may be 
used by police officers to coerce citizens 
into answering questions tnat they need 
not answer, or to allow a search of a 
vehicle that they are not legally obligated 
to allow" When these factors are 
combmed with a ponce officers superior 
position of authority any reasonable per-
son would have ielt compelled to submit to 
the officers questioning 
Id. at 770-71 (citation omitted) (emphasis m 
original) 
1124 Here, as in Roomette the intrusive 
and suspicious questions asked by the officer, 
combmed with the fact that the questions 
were asked immediately after the defendant 
was detained, indicate that a reasonable per-
son would not have ielt free go until they 
answered the additional questions. Further-
more, althougn the questions were not ex-
pressly coercive, the circumstances surround-
ing the request to search made the request 
subtly coercive. Specifically, Officer Hunt-
ington had only issued a warning regarding 
the lack of insurance and ne had not taken 
8. It is irrelevant that Hansen mav have known 
that the searcn would have turned up contra-
band therebv reducing the coercive nature of the 
situation d e Hansen should have Dreterred the 
citation over the searcn) because the reason-
able person test presupposes an innocent per 
son Flonaav Bostick 501 L S 429 437 111 
S O . 2382 2388 115 L. Ed 2d 389 (1991) (em 
phasis in original) accord Micmgan v Chester-
nut 486US~5o7 574 '08 S O . 1975 1979-80 
100 L~Ed.2d 565 U988) ( This reasonable per-
son standard ensures tnat the scope of 
any action regarding the improper left turn. 
Therefore, a reasonable person would not 
have felt that their consent, if given, was a 
voluntary act of tree will because Officer 
Huntington could have ated Hansen for the 
improper lane change if Hansen was uncoop-
erative regarding the search.3 See Florida 
u Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497. 103 S.Ct 1319, 
1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) ("[W]here the 
validity of a search rests on consent, the 
State has the burden of proving that the 
necessary consent was obtained and that it 
was freely and voluntarily given ") (em-
phasis added). 
1125 Officer Huntington did not provide 
clear and positive testimony that Hansen's 
alleged consent was unequivocal and specific. 
Furthermore, in looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, it is clear that officer Hunt-
ington s request was coercive, and a reason-
able person would not have felt free to ignore 
Officer Huntington's request Therefore, De-
cause we indulge every reasonaole presump-
tion against the waiver of fundamental con-
stitutional rights, see Ham. 910 P 2d at 439, 
we hold that the trial court erred in conclud-
ing that Hansen s consent was freely and 
voluntarily given.9 
CONCLUSION 
126 We conclude that the trial court 
erred in denymg Hansen s monon to sup-
press the evidence obtained in the search of 
Hansen's car Hansen was illegally detained 
when Officer Huntington asked for consent 
to search Hansen's vehicle. Officer Hunt-
ington did not provide clear and positive tes-
timony that Hansen's alleged consent was 
unequivocal and specific and freely and intel-
ligently given. In addition, the State did not 
prove that Hansen's alleged consent was giv-
Fourth Amenament protecnon does not vary 
with the state or mind of tne paracuiar individual 
being aoproacned.') 
9 Because we conclude that Hansen did not vol-
untanlv consent to the searcn we do not address 
whether the consent was ootained bv police ex-
pioitanon of the prior dlegalicv See Tkurman 
846 P 2d at 1262 ('If the court determines that 
the consent was not voluntary no rurther analy-
sis is required the consent is invalid anrijhe 
proffered evidence-must be excluded.') 
STATE v. HORROCKS 
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en without duress or coennon. Consequent-
ly, Officer Huntington's search of Hansen's 
vehicle violated Hansen's rights under the 
Fourth Amendment and the trial court erred 
in denying his motion to suppress the evi-
dence discovered in the search. 
1 27 Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
128 
Judge. 
I CONCUR GREGORY K. ORME, 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge 
(concurring in result): 
H29 I agree with my colleagues that 
Hansen was illegally detained when the offi-
cer asked for permission to search his vehicle 
and conducted that search. I also agree that 
the trial court erred in determining that 
Hansen gave his clear and unecnuvocal con-
sent to the search. Having made that deter-
mination, I would not undertake to analyze 
whether Hansen's non-consent was ootained 
without duress or coercion. I would there-
fore concur in the conclusion that the trial 
court erred in denying Hansen's motion to 
suppress. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Blaine HORROCKS, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 990411-CA. 
Gourt of Appeals of Utah. 
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Defendant moved to dismiss felony 
charges on ground that they were barred by 
double jeopardy Decause of his pleas in "the 
Justice Court to various misdemeanor of-
fenses ansmg out of same incident. The 
Fourth District Court, Provo Department, 
Anthony W. Schofield, J., demed motion, and 
defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to 
use or possession of psilocyoin and use or 
possession of marijuana. Defendant appealed. 
The Court of Appeals. Greenwood. P.J.. neld 
that: (1) jeopardy attached wnen justice court 
accepted defendant's pleas to misdemeanor 
offenses; (2) manifest necessity existed to 
allow nnsplea and dismissal of misdemeanor 
charges, such that prosecution could proceed 
on new information without violating double 
jeopardy. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>1134(8) 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny 
a motion to dismiss presents a question of 
law, which is reviewed for correctness. 
2. Criminal Law 0260.13 
Defendant exhausted his right to appeal 
from justice court's dismissal of misdemeanor 
offenses m favor of subsequent felony infor-
mation when he appealed to district court 
under statute providing for trial de novo, and 
he had no right thereafter to appeal district 
court's decision affirming the dismissal. 
U.CA1953, 78-5-120. 
3. Judgment c=>642 
Issue of whether double jeopardy barred 
State's reprosecution of defendant on felony 
charges was not barred on oasis of res judi-
cata or other legal principles by earlier ap-
peal of justice court's dismissal of misde-
meanor offenses ansmg out of same incident, 
where issue in that case was whether signed 
final order was ever issued on defendant's 
pleas and thus wftether those charges could 
be dismissed. 
4. Double Jeopardy o>57 
Jeopardy attaches when a court accepts 
a guilty plea: entry of the plea, rather than 
the actual imposition of the sentence, is the 
critical moment for determining jeopardy. 
U.S.C-A ConstAmend. 5. 
5. Criminal Law <3=>274(3.1) 
Double Jeopardy <5=>57 
Jeopardy attaches once a plea is accept-
ed by the court, but the plea can be set aside 
upon a showing of manifest necessity before 
ADDENDUM B 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-V-
SHAYNE M. HANSEN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo.991903645FS 
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized Illegally, filed in the above-
entitled matter, came on for hearing before the Court on August 4, 1999. Defendant was 
present with his counsel, Otis Sterling HI, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, and the 
State of Utah was represented by N. M. D'Alesandro, Deputy District Attorney. 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence gathered as a result of a warrantless search 
of a vehicle that defendant was driving, arguing that the search was beyond the scope of 
defendant's detention for a traffic stop and that the defendant had not given his voluntary 
consent for officers to search the vehicle. 
Having considered defendant's motion, the sworn testimony of Midvale City 
Police Officer Bruce Huntington, and oral argument, and being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant is charged by Information with Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance (methamphetamine), a Third Degree Felony, and Unlawful 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
2. The Information is based on a traffic stop that occurred on December 11, 
1998, at 20 South Main Street, in Midvale, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. On that date, Midvale Police Officer Bruce Huntington was on patrol, 
alone, in a marked patrol car. 
4. Officer Huntington had been a Midvale police officer for a year and a half 
and had a total of three years of law enforcement experience. 
5. At approximately 11:15 p.m. on December 11, 1998, Officer Huntington 
was southbound on Holden Street in Midvale behind another car. 
6. At the intersection of Holden Street and Center Street, the car that Officer 
Huntington was following made a left turn onto Center Street in order to travel east. 
7. Holden and Center Streets are public highways. 
8. At the intersection of Holden Street and Center Street, vehicles turning 
east onto Center Street are required to enter the inside traffic lane. 
9. The car that Officer Huntington was following turned into the outside 
eastbound traffic lane of Center Street. 
10. Officer Huntington used his laptop computer to check the license plate 
number on the car he was following. 
11. Officer Huntington retrieved the computer record on the license plate 
number and found no insurance information listed. 
12. Officer Huntington stopped the other car by turning on his overhead 
emergency lights. 
13. Both cars stopped at 20 South Main Street. 
14. Officer Huntington approached the other car on foot. 
15. There were two male occupants in the car. 
16. The driver was identified as Shayne M. Hansen, the defendant. 
17. Officer Huntington informed the defendant why he had been stopped and 
requested his driver's license, registration, and insurance information. 
18. Defendant produced a driver's license and registration, but said that he 
could not afford insurance. 
19. Officer Huntington returned to his patrol car and checked the status of 
defendant's driver's license and whether defendant was the subject of warrants. 
20. The driver's license was determined to be valid and there were no 
outstanding warrants. 
21. Officer Huntington approached defendant, returned his driver's license 
and registration, and warned him that he had to obtain insurance for his car and to carry 
proof of insurance in the car. 
22. At the time defendant was warned, he had been detained less than ten 
minutes. 
23. From an objective viewpoint, defendant was clearly free to leave after his 
documents had been returned to him. 
24. After returning the defendant's documents to him, Officer Huntington 
asked defendant two brief questions. 
25. Officer Huntington first asked defendant whether he had any drugs, 
weapons, or paraphernalia in his car. 
26. Defendant told the officer he did not have any drugs, weapons, or 
paraphernalia in the car. 
27. Officer Huntington then asked defendant whether he could search his car. 
28. The officer's question was permissive and did not suggest that he had a 
right to search. 
29. Defendant clearly and unequivocally said "yes," permitting the search. 
30. No appreciable time passed while the officer requested and received 
permission to search. 
31. At the time Officer Huntington requested permission to search, defendant 
was not in custody and had not been cited or told to exit the vehicle. 
32. There was no coercive conduct on the part of the officer to secure 
defendant's consent to search. 
33. Officer Huntington's demeanor, voice, and stature were not coercive in 
nature. 
34. At the time Officer Huntington sought defendant's consent for a search, 
there were no other officers surrounding the defendant. 
35. Officer Huntington did not inform the defendant that he was free to leave 
or that he could deny his request to search. 
36. Officer Huntington asked both occupants to step out of the vehicle. 
37. Officer Huntington searched the interior of the car and found contraband. 
38. Defendant was arrested. 
39 During a search of defendant incident to the arrest, Officer Huntington 
found suspected methamphetamine. 
40. Officer Huntington's testimony was credible. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Given the factual findings, the most compelling legal precedent is Ohio v. 
Robinette. 519 U. S. 33, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996). 
2. The officer had probable cause to stop the car and detain the occupants for 
a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence. 
3. The stop of the vehicle and detention of the occupants were also justified 
by a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was uninsured. 
4. In the totality of circumstances, defendant was lawfully stopped and 
detained. 
5. The detention of the defendant did not exceed the scope of the traffic stop. 
6. At the time consent was obtained, there was no seizure for Fourth 
Amendment purposes because defendant was free to leave. 
7. Although the officer had no warrant, he searched the car pursuant to 
consent given by the defendant, who had apparent authority and control over the vehicle. 
8. Defendant's consent to search was freely and voluntarily given. 
9. There was no illegality preceding defendant's consent to search that 
rendered the consent involuntary. 
10. Defendant's car was lawfully searched. 
11. The evidence wasjawfully seized 
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Approved as to form^ _". 
Otis Sterling III 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-V-
SHAYNE M. HANSEN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 991903645FS 
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis 
The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law, having made findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, and being fully advised of the premises, hereby denies 
defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized Illegally. 
DATED this /S day of SlLjbA- , 1999. 
LESLIE A. EEWIS,"Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Otis Sterling III 
Attorney for Defendant 3/ 
